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The tidelands law of the United States has evolved
sporadically .
increased,

As the nation's population pressures have

and every conceivable type of development has

attempted to locate in the coastal zone (1),

the regulation

of tidelands has become increasingly stringent.

No longer

can a private party fill an acre of tidelands on whim.
the past,

however,

unauthorized tideland development was a

frequent occurrence .

Thus current state governments must

deal with a legacy of improperly rilled tidelands.
paper will

examin~

In

This

some of the states' attempts to address

the problem of illegally improved tidelands.

OVERVIEW

The unique value of the ocean and its shores have been
recognized throughout history.

so that different laws have

been applied to these areas than to their adJoining uplands.
This differential treatment can be traced back to Roman
times,

where it was held that the rivers,

shores could not be privately owned
the Institutes of Justinian,

(2).

the sea and its
In the words of

these resources were "'common

to all,lI (3).
With the decline of the Roman Empire came an erosion of
the public ownership of tidelands (4)'

By the Dark Ages,

the ' En g l i s h Crown claimed private ownership of all shores of
seas and navigable rivers within the ebb and flow of the
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tide,

as well as an exclusive right to fish these areas

The King,

in turn,

granted this right of private ownership

and use of the English shores to favored subJects
As these private grants proliferated,
protested (7).

(~).

(6),

the populace

The public's dissatisfaction with the

Crown's absolute power to dispose of river and shore rights
was partially responsible for the signing of the Magna
Charta by the Crown in 1215 (8),

The Magna Charta

subsequently was interpreted loosely by courts,

forming the

basis for the common law theory (9) which divided the
Crown's claimed right so as to accommodate the interests of
both the King and his subJects in the lands belolJJ mean high
water (10).

Under the theory,

interests in tidelands:
ownership interest,
(11).

the Crown had two kinds of
privatum,

a...lJ:!....§..

and · a

..lJ:!.§.

publicum,

or private
or public interest

The ~ pubiicum provided that the king held the

common rights of navigation and fishing in his soverign
capacity as a representative of the people in pUblic trust
for all his subjects (12).

Thus the Crown could not

transfer this latter interest into private hands

(13)'

Eventually the theory evolved so as to place the

~

publicum under the control of Parliament,
privatum remained with the King

while the .J..Y...a

(14),

Since neither Parliament nor the King held all rights
to the tidelands,

neither could convey clear title to such

lands to private individuals

(5) .

'As a consequence,

when
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the Crown transferred its

~

privatum to other individuals,

their interest always remained subject to the

~

the public rights of fishing and navigation (16) .
Parliament,
~

as the public's representative,

pUblicum,
Only

could convey the

publicum (17).
In the days of the American colonies,

it was

inconceivable that there might be insufficient coastline to
accommodate everyone.

Settlers concentrated on fostering

commerce and industry--constructing wharves,

docks and piers

on tidelands and filling coastal lands as they saw fit (18).
Despite the fact that the pUblic held an interest in
tidelands.

this pUblic trust was often subordinated to

private uses by private developers.
Once the former colonies became independent.

they

succeeded to the tideland rights previously held by the
Crown and Parliament (19)'

The legislature of these states,

as the representatives of the pUblic,

were endowed with the

authority to restrict and regulate the exerise of both the
~

privatum and

~

publicum (20),

The manner in which

each state treated its tidelands varied.
own particular needs.
riparian land owners,

depending upon its

The usual practice was to grant
owners of waterfront property.

preferred right in the adjacent tidelands (21).

a

This right

could consist of a license to use the property or even give
title to the land,

depending on the state.

Riparian

landowners continued the pre-Revolution process of improving
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and filling tidelands as their personal necessities
dictated.
As coastal development pressures began to increase.
the value of the coastal zone became apparent.

and

successively

more rigorous statutory schemes were enacted by state
legislatures to regUlate tidelands use (22).
the early laws were not strictly enforced,

Nevertheless.

and unautho r.ized

improvement of tidelands continued.
It was not until the latter half of this century that
state regulators really began to become concerned with the
illegal filling of,
tidelands (23).

and erection of structures over

The officials were faced with the problem

of what to do about tidelands which had been developed
without the appropriate state authority .

The situation

presented a unique conflict between public and private
interests .

The historic public trust in tidelands was

pitted against private landholders who,

at times,

unwittingly had purchased buildings erected on unlawfUlly
developed tidelands.
The states had a choice.
quo by doing nothing .

They could retain the status

Or they could attempt to identify the

improperly filled lands,

an enormous task possibly requiring

the ascertainment o~ the state's high tide line in colonial
times in order to document claims to property now
constituting illegal upland.
improperly developed land.

If the state then discovered

for instance,

tidelands which
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which now had a house standing upon them,
wit had i 1 emma.

it was presented

The state could allow the house to remain,

or it could attempt to return the land to its
pre-development status by requiring the removal of the
dwelling and subsequent excavation of the land .
state decided to let the house stand,

If the

it could deed the

underlying public property to the private party ror a price
or gratis,

lease the property to the party,

or do nothing.

Just as the states historically have dealt with the
pUblic and private rights in their tidelands differently,
the states which have addressed this problem have come up
with var~n
\ .......

solutions.

This paper will examine the

treatment given unlaWfully improved tidelands in three
states along the North Atlantic seaboard:
Massachusetts and Maine.

New Jers ey,

Its discussion will be restricted

to those improperly developed tidelands which are located
tietween the high and low water lines,

concentrating on

developments which have been in existence for a substantial
1 ength of time.
The Northeast was selected as an area of study because
all the coastal states in this region were,
part of the British Empire.

Thus these states' interest in

tidelands are rooted in the same tradition,
subse~uent

at one time,

making their

treatment Or tidelands more comparable than would

otherwise be the case .

The particular states examined

demonstrate a broad range of statutory solutions to illegal
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development of long-standing tenure.

For instance,

New

Jersey has elected to assert its claim to filled tidelands,
and after identifying the improperly developed lands for
which a state grant

~as

never obtained,

has decided to sell

those developed lands to their present occupants (24)'
Massachusetts,

in contrast,

its affected tidelands,
effort to identify them .

apparently does not plan to sell

nor has it launched a full-scale
Instead it hopes to locate some of

the illegally developed land through a recently enacted
amendment to its licensing statute,

then assessing these

parties the back fees they would have paid if their
improvements had been properly licensed (25).
proper authorization,

Even with the

a license to develop in Massachusetts

is subject to revocation at any time by the legislature
(26),

Maine has taken an entirely different approach to

improperly filled tidelands,

releasing all public interest

in tidelands which were filled before 1976 to their "owners"
(27) .

This paper will analyze each state's tideland law
separately (28).

The legal status of the state's tidelands

will be traced from colonial times.

An historical approach

is necessary because the tideland law of no two states has
evolved identically.

The legal heritage of each statel

combined with its social and economic development to produce
its own unique combination of common and statutory law (29).
Care will be taken in examining each state to discuss its
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most recent attempts to find a palatable solution to the
problem of illegally developed tidelands of long standing.
The discussion will conclude with a summary of the current
status of developed tidelands in the state.
Once the states have .b e e n examined individually,

their

treatment of illegally improved tidelands will be compared
(30) .

Some uniform considerations involved in resolving

tidelands issues will

be

extracted

(31),

Recommendations

ror future state treatment of illegally filled tidelands
w ill

bema d e ( 32 ) .
Some preliminary definitions of terminolgy is reqUired

before embarking on this endeavor.

as coastal law is frought

with words meaning different things to different people .
used herein,

"tidelands" encompasse'S the land'S between the

high and low water marks.
by

the tid e 5

As

(

33 >.

" Tid a 1

which are periodically SUbmerged
f I at

5"

W

ill d e 5 i gnat e tho s e

tidelands between the high and low water marks or one
hundred rods (34) from
less .

th~

high water mark.

whichever is

The "one hundred rod lands" refers to those tidelands

above the low water mark.
high water .

but over one hundred rods below

"Submerged lands" generally will be used to

designate the lands below the low water line which are
constantly covered by water,

except where specific note is

made that the term is meant to include the one hundred rod
I

and s • as we 11.
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LEGAL TREATMENT OF TIDELANDS DEVELOPMENT

New Jersey

Since New Jersey was one of the original thirteen
states.

its .p e o p l e were vested with all the Crown's rights

to New Jersey's tidelands after the American Revolution
The attitude of the state towards these lands is best

(35) .

summarized by the court in Bailey y..:...
the New

~ersey

Supreme Court,

Superior Court.

Driscoll (36).

as affirmed by the New

There
~ersey

held that each state exercises the sovereign

perogative of ownership over its own tidelands.

and thus may

deal with them accordingly to its own views of Justice and
fairness (37).

According to the court.

control over its tidelands to itself,

a state may reserve

or grant these rights

to private individuals or corporations.

as it deems is in

the public's best interests (38)'
Prior to 1851,

the State of New

~ersey

exerted no

general supervision or control over its tidelands (39)'

The

accepted custom of the state was that an owner of riparian
lands could expand his holdings down to the low water mark
by making improvements upon the tidally-washed lands
adJoining his property (40) .

Thus if an upland owner built

a wharf or filled land adjacent to his
high to the low water marks.

propert~

from the

title to that land became

vested in him in fee simple absolute (41)'

Before any
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improvements were made to the tidelands,

however,

the

riparian owner had no property right in this area;

he

merely held a license to improve which was revocable by the
state (42)'

The Wharf Act of 1851 (43) codified this common

law custom (44).
The Wharf Act subsequently was repealed,

and the prior

local custom terminated as to some of New Jersey's tidelands
in 1869 (45),

and as to the remainder in 1891 (46).

might be expected,
statute,

under the language of the repealing

riparian landowners who had built wharves or filled

tidelands prior to 1869 or 1891,
date for the area,
(47).

As

whichever was the relevant

retained title to the affected property

Where this license to artificially appropriate the

tidelands had not been exercised,
the state;

however,

it was revoked by

thesE' latter tidelands remained the state's

pro per t y ( 48 >.
The repealing statute provided that any future
acqUisition of,

filling in or wharfing out upon tidelands

must be authorized by the Riparian Commissioners,

who were

empowered to lease or grant the tidelands to private parties
(49)'

These commissioners initially were very lax,

often

selling or leasing tidal flats for inadequate amounts in
perpetuity (50)'

Moreover,

riparian landowners continued to

fill tidelands without state permission (51).

As much of

the filling took place in the marshes and meadowlands,
then thought valueless,

state authorities paid little

areas
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attention to the status of these lands

(~2).

Much of the

unauthorized private development or state land took place in
good faith,

as it was very hard to determine the location of

the mean high tide line separating public and private
property

(~3)'

With the growth in population,

commerce and navigation

the tidelands became increasingly valuable (54),
limited nature of the tidelands resource,

The

along with citizen

interest in ensuring that the state was sufficiently
compensated ror the private appropriation of these lands
(55),

combined to increase the stringency of review by the

state before leasing or granting tidal lands .
statutory requirement,

dating from 1894 (56),

New Jersey's

that any money

received from the lease or sale of current or former
tidelands must be appropriated for the support
state's public schools (57),
in the tideland issue.

o~

the

compelled great pUblic interest

In New Jersey.

once money or

property has been appropriated to the permanent fund for the
support of free public schools,

the State Constitution

prevents it from being put to any other use (58).
state cannot give away riparian property,
pur p 0 s e 5

(59) .

Thus the

even for pUblic

While the school funds' principa l cannot be
.

used for any purpose,

;

i(~~ interest accrues to support

public education (60).
It was not until 1959 that the State of New Jersey made
any real effort to bolster the school fund

b~

asserting
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claim to the state's marsh and meadowlands (61),

Up until

this time the tideland doctrine primarily had been used to
claim the shores bounding the state's rivers and the ocean
(62) .

While such shores are relatively barren areas where

the mean high tide mark is clearly discernible,
and meadowlands are heavily vegetated,
situated far from the water course,
lost among the covering vegetation

the marshes

lOW-lying areas often

with the high tide mark
(83),

Nevertheless.

by

1961 the Superior Court of New Jersey recognized the state's
claim to thousands of acres of marsh and meadowland flowed
by the tide (64).
The decision that the state had a valid claim to
tidally-affected marsh and meadowlands caused tremendous
public concern (65).

Citizens who held record title to

property in this area were concerned that the court's
holding would cloud title to their land.
unmarketable (66)'

As a consequence,

rendering it

several study

commissions were formed to solve the conflict between the
states' reclamation efforts and private landowners' claims
(67),

Their efforts primarily focused on the Hackensack

Meadowlands in northern New Jersey.
new

the proposed site of a

sports complex (68).
In addition.

various legislative solutions were

introduced to address the overall problem (69).

Among the

proposals were 1964 and 1965 bills that would have exempted
from claims of state ownership all record titles held by a
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property owner or his predecessor for the previous thirty
years which had been assessed taxes for the last twenty
and a 1965 bill which

(70),

p~oposed

that the line

separating private and state land be moved from the mean
high to the mean low water mark
received legislative approval)

(71).

Both types of bills

but never went into effect

because of a gubernatorial veto (72).

Presumably the veto

was due to the constitutional question of whether the
legislature could give away
school fund

lands that were dedicated to the

<73>.

ConseQ.uently)

in 1966 (74) and 1968 (75)

legislative

resolutions proposed putting to a public referendum a
constitutional amendment providing for private ownership if
a history of record ownership and assessment for taxes was
shown.

The proposals calling for amendment of the

Constitution seemed to solve the constitutional Q.uestions
raised by the earlier legislative bills .

The

1966 and 1968

resolutions met a fate similar to their predecessorsl
however,

so that the amendments were never submitted to the

electorate (76)'

Detractors accused the amendments of being

inexcusable "give aways" of New Jersey's tidelands to
private interests (77).
One bill offered during the 1968 legislative term with
a tidelands orientation was successful,

though.

Senate Bill

477 was enacted in response to a suggestion made by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in a meadowlands dispute that "[aJs a
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matter of good housekeeping,

the apprppriate officers of the

state should do what is feasible to catalogue the states'
farflung holdings ."

(78) That law,

which was codified as

Title 13 of the New 0ersey statutes

(79),

directed what is

now the Tidelands Resource Council of the Department of
Environmental Frotection

(80)

"to undertake title studies

and survey of meadowlands throughout the State and to
determine and certify those lands which it f[indsJ are
State-owned lands ." (81) The "meadowlands" SUbject to study
did not encompass all tidelands,

but rather were limited by

definition to "those lands now or formerly consisting
chiefly of salt water swamps,

meadows or marshes."

each meadowlands stUdy was complete,

(82) When

the Council was to

pUblish a map clearly deliniating the lands designated as
state-owned

(83) .

Guidelines concerning which meadowlands were candidates
for state claims
statutory scheme,
In O'Neill,

were given by the case spawning the
O'Neill

~

State Highway Department (84).

the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the

state owns all

lands which a pe tide-flowed up

high tide mark

(85),

to the mean

as well as those lands formerly

tide-flowed where the riparian owner artifically excluded
the tide after the repeal
from the state (86) .

or

the Wharf Act without a grant

Tidelands which had been granted to

private parties by the state,

as well as lands appropriated

by riparian owners pursuant to local custom or the Wharf Act
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prior to its revocation in 1891,

remained in private hands

(87).

In addition to setting forth the criteria for potential
state-owned tidelands,

the O'Neill court

appo~tioned

the

burden of proof of establishing the tidal or nontidal
character of lands between the .s t a t e and private entities .
The court stated that the party claiming that the tideland
status of its property is different from what it presently
appears has the burden of showing that the property's status
was changed by artificial means (B8),

Thus if a particular

piece of nontidal property was claimed by both the state and
a private entity,

the state must demonstrate that this

property is former tidelands which were artificially
appropriated

(89)'

The maps to be produced under the statutory mandate of
Title 13 merely set forth the state's claims,

but were not

intended to resolve the title question (90).

Rather the

enactment was meant to allow persons belieVing that the
status of their meadowlands was inaccurate as mapped to
require the Council to review its determination (91).
Aggrieved parties also were given the right to initiate a
quiet title suit against the state (92).
Although Title 13 mandated the state scrutinize only
meadowlands.

the State Department of Environmental

Protection decided to research all the tidelands in which
the

~tate

might have an interest (93) .

This was in part

,,
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because the O'Neill decision gave notice to both the state
and private occupants of land fronting the ocean and its
tributaries of the possibile state interest in these lands
(94).

In the late 1970's,

the state especially began to

consider the possibility that owned " the increasingly
valuable lands around the new Atlantic City casinos (95).
In order to avoid the lengthy delays that could be involved
if a

title dispute were to arise,

at least five casino

developers paid a total of five and one-half million dollars
to the state in "nonrefundable considerations" to ensure
that title to their land would remain clear of future state
claims (96)'

In most cases,

these potential claims never

act ua 11 y ar 05 e (97).
Once the state laid claim to the c e s i no v Land s ,

it was

obvious that it eventually would have to pursue claims
against private homeowners (98).

Uncertainty as to the

legal ownership of riparian properties was rampant,

because

if the upland status of the property was created by an
impermissible method,
(99) .

Moreover.

the lands might belong to the state

if a property had been conveyed several

times since the improvement of the riparian land,

it was

nearly impossible for the present owner to discern whether
the state could make a bona fide claim to his land (100).
To bring some legislative relief to the riparian
homeowners of southern New Jersey and to expedite casino
claims,

a legislative initiative was introduced in 1981 to
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relinquish state claims in

an~

property that had not been

tidal within the preceding forty years (101),

Because the

proposal would bar state claims to former tidelands with a
given history,

and the proceeds from the sale of these lands

had been constitutionally "d e d i c a t e d to the public schools.
the legislature believed a constitutional amendment was
nee d e d (1 02 ) .

The amendment applied to both meadowland and
nonmeadowland property that was formerly,
tidally flowed (103)'

but not currently.

It specifically provided that the

state. could not claim lands

whic~

~ad

not been washed by the

tides within a forty year time period unless the state
"specifically defined and asserted" its claims to the land
within that forty years (104).

To allow for the fact that

some formerly tidal property would have been filled for more
than forty years before the amendment's adoption,

the

amendment was SUbsequently revised to allow the state one
year from its passage to define and assert state claims to
these tidelands (105).
The amendment alone deprived the state of nothing
(106).

When adopted.

did before .

the state would own exactly what it

The amendment simply

re~uired

the state to make

its claim to former tidelands within a specified period
(107).

The legislature intended to give the private

landowner only the relief of knowing whether the state
claimed his property (108) .

The landowner then could
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challenge the decision administratively or Judicially (109),
or attempt to obtain a grant of the land from the state
(110)'

The relative merits of the amendment was a subJect of
heated public debate,

with opponents including Governor

Byrne and his administration (111).

Nevertheless,

three-fifths of the legislature agreed to submit the
initiative to the people of the state (112).

The debate

concerning the proposed amendment continued, with some
people characterizing the amendment as a "giveaway" (113) .

Two lawsuits relating to the amendment were filed before the
balloting (114).

One suit dealt with the wording of the

interpretive statement which was to be placed on the ballot
with the amendment (115),

while the other challenged the

amendment's constitutionality and subsequent interpretation
(116).

The amendment was adopted by a slight majority of New
Jer.sey citizens on November 3,

1981 (117).

Because the

amendment allowed the state only one year to "specifically
define and assert [its] claim" to former tidelands which had
not been tidally flowed within the preceding forty years
(118),

and all but four of New Jersey's twenty-one counties

contained some form of tidelands (119),
on the state were enormous.

the time pressures

How a claim had to be

"specifically defined and asserted" was thus important.
Since the amendment itself did not define this terminology,
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it was left to the state's courts.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in 1983 that all the
amendment required for a valid claim was that the state
declare its claim in good faith and notify any adversely
affected property owner
be followed

(121).

(120).

No specific procedure had to

As of November 1982,

when ·t h e one-year

grace period for claiming lands not tidally flowed
past forty years had expired,

in the

the court found the state had

properly defined and asserted its claim to 150,000 acres of
land

(122) along the New Jersey coast from New York City to

Cape May

(123).

The state did not meet the requisite

standard when it made more generalized claims to 77,000
acres (124) along the Delaware Bay and River from Cape May
to Trenton,
decision,

New Jersey

(125).

As a result of the court's

the state lost any potential claim to areas not

tidally flowed since November of 1941 in the Delaware tidal
region.

a

loss characterized as "limited ll by the court

( 126) .
Once the constitutional amendment was passed many
riparian homeowners felt the dilemma of competing state
claims to their land was allowed

(127).

But with the

state's filing of numerous claims along the Atlantic coast,
it was clear that they were wrong,

and that the ownership of

a substantial amount of property was in dispute (128),
Opinions varied as to the potential cost · to such
homeowners of clearing the title to their land.

According
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to Save the School Fund,

a group opposing the amendment,

the

average cost of the 226 state grants issued to homeowners
between 1971 and 1981 was not prohibitively
expensive--S1,685 (129).
similar average,

Another source came up with a

stating that fifty-one percent of these

claims were settled for $1,000 or less (130).

But the

common understanding was that in order for a property owner
to rid his title of a state claim.

he had to buy a riparian

grant from the State of New Jersey,

paying the current fair

market value of the disputed land plus any improvements
thereon (131),
house,

Thus if the land in

ques~ion

it was believed that the homeowner,

contained a

in effect.

repurchase his house at current prices (132) .

had to

Whil·e the

cost to some homeowners would be covered by their title
insurance policies.
coverage (133).

many policies

exce~ted

state claims from

Clear title is mandatory if a riparian

owner wants to sell his land,

as naone will buy it while a

state claim is pending (134).
In order to avoid penalizing persons who bought
riparian property never suspecting it was improperly filled.
a second initiative was introduced in the legislature in
1982 (135)'

This initiative proposed balloting on an

amendment to the State Constitution which would empower the
legislature to pass laws setting the compensation rate that
a property owner would have to pay to clear title to his
land (136).

Under the proposaL

the compensation foT'
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o~

riparian lands could be "less than the Pair market value
the state's interest,

or nominal, "(137) although the state

would not be reqUired to accept a reduced price (138),

The

amendment proposed to allow the legislative scheme to
differentiate between properties used for different
purposes,

i.

e.

between commerciaL

municipal and

re.sidential properties (139) ,
The legislature unanimously approved putting the second
referendum on the ballot (140) ,

Despite having the support

of Governor ·Ke a n and his administration,

a well as the

majority of the state legislators (141),

New Jersey voters

reJected the proposal by a three to two margin in November
of 1982 (142)'

The defeat was at least partially due to an

extensive lobbying effort by Save the School Fund,

which

claimed that millions of dollars would be lost if the
amendment was adopted (143).
After the rejection of the 1982 amendment,

the state

declared that it would not evict residents on property
claimed by the state (144) because it did not want to eJect
good faith buyers who never realized they were purchasing
former tidelands (145),
pursued its claims.

Thus the state has not actively

and could not even if it so desired,

since the Department of Environmental Protection has
insufficient manpower to follow through on each property
claim (146).
however,

Homeowners who want to sell their land,

still must obtain clear title.

since it is
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unmarketable in its present state (147).
These people can choose one of two ways to clear their
title.

One possibility is to bring a quiet title action

against the state,
to the land.

thus forcing

the state to prove its claim

It appears this course of action has a good

chance of success,

since the state would have the burden of

proving the former tidal condition of the land from old
records not designed to document riparian claims (148) .
Moreover,

in the past the state has not done well

riparian litigation (149).

This option,

substantial amount of time and money.

however,

in
takes a

both of which may be

at a premium for a potential seller.
The other alternative is for the homeowner to buy a
riparian grant from the state.

This has been the preferred

method for clearing title to date

(150)'

The homeowner

applies for a grant from the Tidelands Resource Board.
Although the approval of the Board.

the Commissioner of

Environmental Protection and the Governer is required for
the grant to be made (151),

authorization is usually given

for good faith purchasers of filled

land

(152).

If the

householder successfully shows that he bought his land in
good faith

before the state asserted its claim,

he pays a

"nominal flee" for the grant--twenty-five percent of its
appraised fair market value

(153).

Industrial,

commercial

and municipal riparian owners go through the same procedure
( 154).

Thus it seems that although the 1982 referendum was
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defeated,

it lives on in the form of reduced prices for

riparian grants to "good faith"
As for the school fund.

upland owners.

on October of 1982 it totalled

thirty-eight million dollars (155),

with an average annual

increase of about two million dollars between 1976 and 1981
being due to the sale and lease of tidelands (156) ,

The

size of the fund has been increasing more rapidly since the
state's assertion of its tidelands claims

(157).

Because

under the state's constitution the fund's principal can not
be touched

(158),

it seems unlikely that enough time has

passed for the interest attributable to recently sold
tidelands to make a dent in New Jersey's two billion dollar
annual budget for school aid

(159) .

To summarize the current status of New Jersey
tidelands,

if a person lives on apparent upland in New

Jersey which has not been washed by the tide in the past
forty years,

nor properly claimed by the state prior to

November of 1982 as former tidelands,
outright (160).

If.

been tidally flowed

however.

he owns his property

his apparent upland has either

in the past forty years (161),

or if not

so flowed has been appropriately claimed by the state prior
to November of 1982 as former tidelandsl

the private party

will have to resolve the conflicting state claim prior to
selling his land

(162).

If the land a person claims as his

is currently washed by the tide.
is

inval~d

his claim to the property

unless he can show one of two things:

either
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that his predecessor in title artificially appropriated the
land by erecting a structure such as a wharf prior to 1869
or 1891,

whichever is the relevant date for the area (163),

and such appropriation has continued to this day without an
long interruption (164);

unreasonably

or,

that he holds a

lease . or grant 9f the land from the state (165).

Massachusetts

Like New

Jerse~,

the colonists of Massachusetts

received their rights in tidelands from the English Crown
(166),

The property of the Crown in the Massachusetts area

originally was given to the companies chartered to settle
Plymouth and Massachusetts Eay colonies

(167)'

Since the

companies received no more interest in tidelands than the
Crown held,

they could deed their

~

mean high water to private parties,
publicum in trust for the public

privatum in land below

but retained the

~

(168).

The new Massachusetts Eay Colony had different
requirements than the Crown and as early as the 1640's its
treatment of tidelands diverged from that of the colony that
became New Jersey.

The Massachusetts colonists needed to

encourage commerce and navigation by building wharves,

but

did not have the public funds for the endeavor (169)'

Thus

the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 was passed to encourage
private shorefront development (170),

It gave the riparian
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owner of

l~nds

adjoining tidally affected salt water

"propriety" over tidelands to the low water mark or one
hun dred rod s (171),

whie h eve r wa 5 1 e S

over the tidal flats (172»,
with navigation (173).

(t hat is,

5

pro pr i e t y

provided he did not interfere

The rights given to the riparian

owner were subject to the same

~

publicum that was in

effect when the land was owned by the Crown--the public
rights of navigation.
Nevertheless,

fishing and fowling (174).

as long as the riparian owner did not

materially interfere with navigation,
structures over,

or fill

in,

he could erect

tidal -Flats (175),

seemingllj

extinguishing the pUblic rights in the property (176),
Until such action was taken,

the riparian ownership was

SUbject to the pUblic rights (177) .
When the independent province of Massachusetts was
;ormed,

the rights of the trading companies in Massachusetts

tidelands passed to the province (178),
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts.

and subsequently to

Riparian owners

throughout the commonwealth continued to enJoy the rights
given them by the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (179) ,
Wharves sprang up alon g the waterfront and increasing
amounts of tidelands were reclaimed (180).
1800's,

By the early

the common practice of the commonwealth legislature

was to grant wharfing privileges to

va~ious

companies so

they could extend structures over the tidal flats onto
submerged lands (181).

The development pressures were

PAGE 26

especially great in Boston Harbor (182),

By the mid-1800's.

investors who had speculated in

harbor property attempted to capitalize on their investment
by pressuring
~lats

the legislature to grant the commonwealth's

to private owners (183),

backfired.

Their lobbying efforts

resulting in the creation of a permanent Board of

Harbor Commissioners in 1866.

whose approval was required

for any proposed development of tidelands (184).
addition,

In

the board was empowered to lease tidelands

belonging to the commonwealth

(185).

Provision was made to

require compensation by parties which displaced tidewater by
locating any structure below the high water mark or filling
the tidal flats

(186) .

The compensation was either in the

Torm of an excavation by the party of a basin elsewhere in
the harbor's tidelands to allow an equivalent amount of
water to gather as the development had displaced,
in lieu of excavation

(187)'

more common practice (18S),

or payment

The latter was apparently the
The legislature also declared

that any unauthorized development which took place
high water mark was a public nuisance.
commonwealth to institute a
n u i san c e

belo~

the

and empowered the

lawsuit to enjoin or remove the

(1 89 ) .

In 1869 the legislature declared that all authority or
license granted from that day forward to build on.
or enclose tidelands was "revocable at any time,
discretion of the legislature.

fill

in

at the

"(190) This license expired
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if not used within five years of its issuance (191) :
1874,

By

the legislature required compensation in addition to

the tidewater displacement charge if a private party was
granted license to build over or fill
the commonwealth held title (192) .
encompassed submerged lands,

in tidelands to which
the statute

Presumabl~

including the one hundred rod

I and sCI 93 ) .

Despite the requirement that one had to obtain a
license before developing any tidelands after 1866,
unauthorized development continued (194).

The status of

these filled and altered tidelands was unclear.

Although

they were deeded from one private party to another.

the

commonwealth arguably retained an interest in them by virtue
of the public trust impressed upon them,

especially if they

were commonwealth lands for which no compensation was paid.
The title uncertainties peaked in 1979.

This was when

the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was presented with
the question of who owned the land underlying a Boston
Harbor wharf which had been erected under the auspices of an
1832 legislative enactment (195).

Earlier in the century

the court had decided that pre-1869 enactments authorizing
development were grants of the land.
licenses like their successors (196).
Development Corporation

~

rather than revocable
In Boston Waterfront

Commonwealth (197),

however,

the

?upreme Judicial Court determined that. at least as to lands
below the historic law waterline.

enactments which did not
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expressly and unequivocably state that all the public's
interest in the lands was transferred,

conve~ed

less than

absolute title in the underlying land to private
(198)'

Rather.

parti~s

such acts were grants of title "s ub j e c t

to

the condition subsequent that it [the land] be used for the
public purpose for which it was granted.

"(199) The court

believed this condition was imposed by virtue of the fact
that submerged lands are impressed with a public trust
( 200>'
The general understanding of a grant of title subJect
to such a condition subsequent is that if the land ever
-f a i l s .to be used for the condition imposed,

title to the

property reverts back to its original owner (201)--here,
commonwealth (202),

the

A similar condition logically would be

imposed on the one hundred rods lands,
below the low tide line.

since like the lands

these tidelands were not subJect to

SUbject to the terms of Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (203) .
The Boston Waterfront Devlopment decision did not alter
the status of filled tidal flats:

the riparian owners still

held these lands subject to the pUblic rights of fishing,
fowling and navigation (204),

and even those public rights

were arguably extingUished if a riparian owner built on his

flats so as to completely exclude the public without
unreasonably interfering with navigation (205),
Nevertheless,

the decision raised questions in the minds of

many of the purported owners of filled tidelands.

Thus
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during both its 1980 (206) and 1981 terms the Massachusetts
legislatu~e conside~ed

bills to clarify the title to filled

tidelands in Boston Harbor which were below the primitive
hi 9 h wa t er mar- k (207) .
The 1981 bill provided that no limitation was to be
implied,

unless expressly stated.

deeds

which the commonwealth purported to create rights

by

in legislative acts or

in waters and lands below the primitive high water mark in
Boston (208) .

Apparently this provision was designed to

legislatively overrule the Boston Waterfront decision (209)The bill also declared that any tidelands lying landward of
the 111980 line" (a line drawn on a map of the Boston Harbor
area in 1980.
past had

b~en

landward of which was property that.
tidal flats (210»

future would be.

which had been.

in the

or in the

filled pursuant to the express language of

a commonwealth enactment or grant was for a proper public
purpose.

and any vestigial interest of the commonwealth in

such tidelands was eliminated (211).

Thus the legislature

basically proposed that if any public interest did remain in
the lawfully filled tidal flats.
al iminated (212)'

these public rights were

As to land seaward of the 1980 line

<which consisted of former submerged lands (213»l

the bill

provided that the decision as to whether the release

o~

the

vestigial rights of the commonwealth would be in the pUblic
interest was to be made on a parcel by parcel basis by the
Executive Office of Environmental

A~fairs

(214) .
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Despite receiving a favorable advisory opinion from the
Supreme Judicial Court on the bill's constitutionality
(215),

it was never enacted.

Instead,

a less radical

legislative scheme was passed in December of 1963 to
"immediately prOVide more comprehensive protection to the
Massachusetts coastline .

"(216) The 1983 law essentially

modified tidelands statutes which were already in place.
The most noteworthy of the changes is one mandating that any

future license for tideland development must authorize a
specific use <217>'
Prior to the law's passage,
development was generic,

50

a license for tidal

that the type of development

licensed could change without an update of the license
(218) .

a wharf,

For example,
he

if a person received approval to build

subse~uently

could fill the underlying lands

without the knowledge or interference of the commonwealth.
Now "any change in use or substantial structural alteration
0; a licensed stucture

OT"

fill,

Il

req,1.!ires that one obtain a

new license from the Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering (219). regardless of when the original license
was issued (220)'

As a result,

the commonwealth will be

able to keep track of tidelands uses.

If a developer does

not comply with the terms of his license,

it can be revoked

<221>.

Another significant change is the inclusion of the
terms "commonwealth tidelands" and "private tidelands" in
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the tidelands statutes along with their definitions (222),
According to the Act.

"commonwealth tidelands" refers to

both tidelands held by the commonwealth in trust for the
public,

and tidelands held by some other party which arE'

subJect either to an express or an implied condition
swbsequent that they be used for a public purpose (223)--in
other words,

the SUbmerged lands,

one hundred rod lands .

presumably including the

nprivate tidelands" is defined to

include tidelands held by a private party subJect to a
public easement for navigation,

fishing and fowling

(224)--seemingly the tidal flats SUbJect to riparian
ownership under the Colonial Ordinance.

The new enactment

provides that .i n order for a structure or fill to be
licensed upon either type of tidelands.
to accommodate a water dependent use,

it must be necessary

unless public hearings

are held and certain findings made (225).

There is an

additional requirement that developments upon commonwealth
tidelands,

even when furthering a water dependent use,

must

serve a proper public purpose (226)'
By superimposing the most recent legislative treatment

of Massachusetts tidelands upon the former law,
can summarize the status of filled and
tidelands as follows.

it seems one

othe~wise

improved

Any riparian owner whose predecessor

in title erected structures upon or filled his tidal flats
prior to 1869 holds complete title to these lands (227).
Those whose predecessors developed submerged lands
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(including one hundred rod lands> during this time with
legislative authorization,

but without receiving an express

grant of all the commonwealth's rights and interest in the
lands obtained,

at best,

title to the property s ub j e c t

to

the condition that the land be used for the public purpose
for which it was granted (228).

Any license granted after

1868 for the development of any tidelands.
flats or SUbmerged lands,

be they

tidal

gives the licensee only a

revocable development right (229).

This right expires if

not exercised within five years, and even if exercised,

can

be withdrawn by the legislature at any time (230)Thus riparian owners may have "propriety" in their
adjacent tidal flats,
before 1868,
trust.

but unless the flats were developed

this entitlement remains subject to the public

The pUblic interest seemingly may require that

post-IS6S development not occur at all.
authorized to take place,
removed,

or if it is

that the development later be

giving way to the public rights of navigation,

fishing and fowling.

How title to these flats would be

characterized is unclear.,
developed flats.

as is the title to unlawfully

Title to submerged lands (including the

one hundred rod lands> developed after 1868 remains in the
commonwealth,

with a license to

d~velop

being revocable at

an y tim e (231) .
As to those tidelands which were unlawfully filled or
improved after 1866,

the improvements are considered

b~

law
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to comprise a pUblic nuisance,

and are subJect to legal

action to enjoin or abate them (232) .
however,

Practically speaking,

it is unlikely that the commonwealth will require

that long-time illegal
begin with,

improvements be removed

To

(233)'

it is improbable that long-term unlawful

development will be discovered,

because of the

commonwealth's lack of personnel to trace such development

(234),

If it is detected,

it will probably be 'b e c a u s e the

private "owner" changes his use of the tideland,

and thus

SUbjects himself to the relicensing requirements of the new

law (235).

Once the illegal actiVity is discovered,

the

worst that is likely to happen is that the developer will be
charged past assessments for tidewater displacement,

as well

as an additional fee for the use of commonwealth lands,
a p p 1 i cab I e

if

( 236 ) .

t1a i ne

Since Maine was part of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts when Massachusetts became a state,

it is not

surprising that the two state's tidelands law pursued a
similar course for a
t1arch

15,

1820,

long time.

Maine achieved statehood on

when it separated from Massachusetts (237)-

Thus the pre-1820 statutory and common law of Maine is
identical to that of Massachusetts
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47,

(238).

For instance,

the

although never enacted by the
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Maine legislature,

has been adopted by the Maine courts as

part of its common law (239)'

Hence the rights of' the

riparian landowner in Maine tidal flats has been
characterized as a qualified one--qualified by the public
rights of navigation,

fishing and fowling

(240).

the tidelands remain in their natural state,
the right to navigate.
(241) .

As long as

the public has

fish and fowl the overlying waters

These public rights are extinguished,

however,

once

the riparian owner encloses or fills in his adJacent flats,
as long as he does not unreasonably interfere with
navigation (242).
This is not the situation for the one hundred rod
lands,

though .

These tidelands were unaffected by the

Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (243),

and have been generally

treated like submerged lands (244)'

Thus after the American

Revolution,

the state retained both the

~

Dublicum and

privatum interests in the one hundred rod lands (245).
legal matter,

~

As a

they were not subJect to private appropriation

without state authorization (246),
While the state apparently has never given away or sold
any of its

subme~ged

lands below the low

wate~

mark (247),

whether similar activity has taken place with regards to the
one hundred rod lands is less clear .

It is known,

that orten these lands were filled

built upon by private

o~

howeve~,

parties without any conveyance or authorization by the
state, as were the nearshore tidal flats and the offshore
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submerged lands (248).
Prior to 1876,

the riparian owner of tidal flats could

erect wharves upon the flats without any governmental
involvement,

the only limitation being that he could not

materially interfere with navigation (249)'
license was required,
tidelands (250).

though.

Legislative

to erect fishing wiers on

Then in 1876 the Maine legislature enacted

a statute which dealt with the licensing of both wharves and
weirs (251),

It required a potential developer to obtain a

public permit from the town prior to erecting either type of
structure on tidelands (252L

under a valid license,

Once a wharf was erected

it could not be ordered removed even

if it obstructed navigation (253),
though,

Without the license,

the Wharf was an unlawful structure (254) .

Nevertheless,

private individuals often built wharves and

piers over these state tidelands after 1876 without the
re~uisite

license (255).

Apparently it was not
tidelands was regulated .

u~til

1967 that the filling of

Prior to this time it was legal

for a riparian landowner to fill his adJacent flats under
the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (256) without state
license.

In contrast.

since the lands seaward of the flats

(the one hundred rod and submerged lands) belong to the
state (257),

they could not lawfully be filled without state

authorization,

although they were filled (258L

The Wetlands Control Act of 1967 was passed to protect
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the public

inte~est f~om

alte~ation

(259) .

It

the consequences of coastal wetland

~equi~ed

a

~ipa~ian

Dwne~

to obtain

permission from the municipality and the Wetlands Control
Board before altering any land subJect to tidal action above
extreme low water (260).

Thus the Act governed the filling

of and building upon both flats and one hundred rod lands.
Apparently it was believed

initiall~

unlawful to fill submerged lands,
needed for this area.

that since it was

no license provision was

The provision governing coastal

wetlands have been amended a number of times since 1967,

so

that it now applies to both tidal and subtidal (SUbmerged)
lands (261).

Permits presently ane now granted by either

the Board of Environmental Protection or the town (262).
with their decision being based upon considerations such as
whether the activity will unreasonably inte rfere with
recreation or navigation,

or will cause certain detrimental

environmental effects (263) .
Whether the state's tidal and submerged lands have been
developed legally or illegally,

the responsible parties

generally Claimed ownership of the underlying land,
as the structures above (264),
lands as

i~

they were their own,

as well

They used and conveyed the
without paying any

consideration to the state or acknowledging the public's
interest in the land (265).

Some of the most visible land

treated in this manner was the waterfront of the Portland
Harbor,

a large part of which consists of filled land (266).
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In 1975,

the Maine

legislatu~e

decided to reestablish

the state's rights to its sUbmerged and tidal lands.
Through the Submerged Lands Act of 1975 the legislature
authorized the Bureau of Public Lands within the Department
of Conservation (267).

to lease the state's interest in

submerged (268) and intertidal lands (269) to private
parties (270)'

The statute provided for a maximum lease

term of thirty years in order to enable these persons to
lawfully build upon and fill the lands (271).

The

legislature allowed for no-cost easements for noncommercial,
recreational use by the upland owner,
operations

occ~pying

state tidelands,
processing,

as well as for

one hundred square feet or less of the

facilities relating to fish landing or

and fedlHal harbor improvement pr o j e c b s (272) ,

The legislature also granted the owners of all structures
actu~lly

upon the submerged and intertidal lands on the

effective date of the legislation a thirty year no-cost
easement to those lands (273).
Lan d s ".

as later defined.

Since the term "intertidal

coincided exactly with the portion

of tidelands subJect to appropriation by riparian owners
under the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (274),
~uestionable

it is

whether the state had any rights left to lease

in those intertidal lands which already had been f ·illed
(275) .

The leasing statute did not address the issues of
whether the public retained an interest in illegally filled
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state lands and who "owned" these lands (276),

These

concerns were brought into focus when neither the city of
Portland nor the Bath Iron Works could figure out from whom
to obtain ownership rights in order to develop former
tidelands (277),

The result was the passage of further

leg is 1 a t ion in 1981 (278 >.
The 1981 Act enactment released the state's pUblic
trust interest in SUbmerged and intertidal lands filled on
or before October I.

1975 (the effective date of Maine's

Submerged Lands Act) to the "owners" of these lands (279),
unless they had been filled since 1967 in violation of the
Wetlands Act (280).
the Act,

Although "owners" was not defined by

the term apparently refers to the parties who

filled the lands,

and their successors in interest.

In order to grant away the public's trust interest in
former one hundred rod and submerged lands.

the legislature

had to find the grant to be in the public interest (281).
In the first section of the 1981 Act,

therefore.

the

legislature declared that such lands as had been filled
prior to the effective date of the Submerged Lands Act were
"substantially valueless for trust uses" and could be
disposed of without impairing the public trust in the
remaining lands (282).

The legislature believed that the

public would benefit by a clarification of the title status
of such filled lands,
and d eve lop men t

( 283 ) .

"thereby permitting [their) full use
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Prior to the law's enactment,

the Maine Supreme

Judicial Court rendered an advisory opinion upholding these
legislative findings and declaring the statute
constitutional (284).

The court stated that giving up the

public rights in the filled lands was "reasonable for the
benefit of the people" as required to withstand
constitutional challenge,

based upon a unique combination of

legislative and Judicial findings (285).

Besides deciding

that the legislature might reach the conclusions stated in
the Act (286),

the Court found that clearing title to the

lands so commercial and other activity could proceed without
legal reservation was a "legitimate and important pUblic
pur p 0 5 e .

" (287)

Since the law would prevent disruption of the state's
economy,

the court believed the public as a whole was

benefited (288).

Moreover,

the court relied on the

legislative finding that municipalities,

which depend on the

filled lands for part of their tax base,

could not afford to

lose this source of revenue (289).

The legislative

conclusion that there was insufficient documentation to
determine the former high and low water marks along Maine's
coast so as to evidence the state's claims was also
important to the court (290)'

The court declared that the

legislature could conclude that a case-by-case resolution of
the status of the filled lands would be expensive,
consuming and impractical (291).

time

Although some of the
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filled submerged lands might be useful for wharves and other
coastal facilities,

the court decided the legislature could

reasonably conclude that the public's need ror the
facilities was not substantial enough to Justify leaving the
title to all of Maine's coastally filled land in limbo
(292 >.

The court believed that equity

Justi~ied

confirming the

expectation of private ownership by private parties who had
long relied upon their title to the filled lands,
~unicipalities

that had taxed those lands (293),

and in the
Finally,

the court noted that by releasing its title to the filled
lands,

the state had not lost any of its broad authority to

regulate their development through zoning and other devices
(294) .

As might be expected,
1981

some people Characterized the

enactment as "the greatest giveaway in the state's

history," and predict it forecasts the death of public trust
law in Maine (295),

Despite these doomsdayers,

has yet to be challenged,

the statute

and apparently is achieving its

purpose of clearing the clouded title to many former
tidally-affected lands .

As matters now stand, anyone who filled tidelands or
submerged lands on or before October
successor in title,

1,

1976.

or their

owns the filled land outright,

unless

they were filled since 1967 without the requisite approval
of municipality under the Wetlands Control Act (296).

Those
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who built wharves or other structures over lands that have
remained submerged (that is,

one hundred rod lands and

seaward) prior to October L

1976,

or those who filled in

violation of the Wetlands Control Act prior to this date
have a no-cost easement to use the land which expires in
year 2005 (297).

After that it seems they will have to

negotiate leases for the lands under their structures or
fill,

if the erections and fill are allowed to remain,

currently contemplated (298)'

as is

This lease arrangement

distresses some of the affected wharf owners,

who claim they

have paid taxes on the lands underlying their structures for
years,

and believe they own the lands (299)'

their lease status and its uncertainties,

As a result of

a number of owners

are unwilling to expend money ror improvements to their
fa c iii tie s

( 300 ) .

The title of riparian landowners to the tidelands
abutting their property beneath wharves and structures seems
unaffected by the recent legislation.

Since 1975,

however,

it is apparently impossible to have acquired private title
to one hundred rod lands or submerged lands,
even to tidal flats,
whal' fin g

0

ut

0

and perhaps

by virtue of filling these .l a n d s or

v e r the m ( 301 ) .

Ins tea d ,on emu s t

0

b t a ina

lease to these lands under the Submerged Lands Act before
commencing the bUilding or filling activity.

As of 1983 the

going price for most such leases was three cents a square
foot,

although the state is empowered to charge a fee based
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on the appraised value of the property (302).

COMPARISON OF STATES' LEGAL TREATMENT OF TIDELANDS DEVELOPMENT

It is striking how similar the evolution
law has been in New Jersev,

~f

tidelands

Massachusetts and Maine.

Like

social and economic considerations in the Northeast
apparently produced like treatment of tidelands.
The progression of tidelands law in these three states
can be divided into three stages .

In the first stage,

private development proliferated without regulation.

as the

young states attempted to establish a foothold in national
and international commerce.

During the second stage,

states began to regulate tidelands development,

the

as their

major harbors became crowded and difficult to navigate
because af enormous private expansion into the states'
tidewaters .

In the last and current stage.

tidelands legislation is being introduced,

more rigorous
as coastal zone

preservation has become increasingly important,
states are trying to sort out who owns what.
stages will be examined in mare detail,
similarities among.

and the

Each of these

with the

and differences between the state's

activities in each stage being compared .
The first stage began in colonial times and continued
through the mid-nineteenth

centur~,

as riparian owners in

all three states appropriated the tidelands adJoining their
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uplands for their own private use.
Maine,

In Massachusetts and

the result primarily was achieved by means of a

regional colonial enactment (303) which later was integrated
into larger common law of the two states

(304) .

In New

Jersey the law evolved in the opposite direction.

There the

common law custom of allowing private tideland expansion was
later codified in 1851

(305).

The allowance for the expansion of private claims into
tidelands reflected the commercial needs of a growing
nation.

Money was required to finance waterfront

development:

such structures as wharves,

warehouses (306).

piers and

What better way to achieve the investment

of private capital than to make it attractive by allowing
for the private acquisition of land?
Maine,

In Massachusetts and

the area of private appropriation was limited to

tidal flats

(307),

while in New Jersey the riparian owner

could develop down to the low water mark
In all three states,

(308)-

private development of the

relevant tidelands prior to the mid-1800's gave the
developer and his sUCCessors a preferential right to those
lands.

New Jersey citizens who artificially appropriated

tidelands prior to 1869 or 1891 received clear title to the
lands in perpetuity

(309).

In Massachusetts and Maine,

dlthough the riparian owners' rights in the tidal flats were
qualified prior to development by the pUblic rights of
fishing,

fowling and navigation

(310),

to the extent that
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these flats were filled prior to the imposition of state
regulation,

it appears that the public trust was

extinguished (311).

It can be argued that the

publi~

rights

remain in those flats over which structures were erected,
since it still is possible to fish.

fowl and navigate the

underlying waters .
In New Jersey,

where riparian landowners had not

improved the adjacent tidelands prior to the imposition of
development regulations in 1869 and 1891,

the license to

gain title by artificially appropriating these lands Was
revoked (312).

Riparian owners in Massachusetts and Maine

still retain this right,

SUbJect to permitting requirements

(313)'
Licensing requirements are the hallmark of entry into
the second stage of the development of tidelands law.
the three states examined,

In

the second stage spanned the

mid-1800's to around the 1960's.

Harbor traffic was booming

by the mid-nineteenth century (314),

and the unregulated

expansion of wharves into the ha nbors impeded commercial
traffic .

The filling of tidelands further reduced naVigable

harbor space.
regime;

Thus all three states instituted a permitting

New Jersey's (315) and Massachusett's (316)

requirements applied to all tidelands development,

while

Maine's only applied to the erection of wharves and weirs
(317).
In each of the three states either a specialized
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board's,

or else the town's permission was required before

the relevant tideland development could occur.
Jersey

(318) and

became a

M~ssachusetts

In New

(319) the licensing process

potentially profitable venture because of the

various fees imposed,

although this was not the case in

Maine.
The New Jersey approach was to create a group of
Riparian Commissioners,
tideland development,

which,

in addition to licensing

leased and sold the tidelands which

were to be developed to private parties
began in 1869 in some areas,

and

(320).

This process

in 1891 along the remainder

of the coast (321).
In Massachusetts.
instituted

in 1866,

a similar authorization scheme was

with the Board of Harbor Commissioners'

permission being required before tidelands were improved
(322),

SubseQ.uent enactments in the 1860's and 1870's made

it clear,

though,

that Massachusetts was not planning on

using the New Jersy method of selling
Instead,

Massachusetts designed a

its tidelands.

leasing arrangement.

Any

development license issued after 1869 was made revocable at
the instance of the legislature

(323),

to attain a vested development right.
structure was imposed so

th~t ~ny

so it was impossible
In addition,

a

fee

private party which

proposed to displace tidal water in its improvement scheme
had to pay a tidewater displacement fee

(324)'

An

additional charge was levied if commonwealth tidelands were
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being developed (325).
Maine began requiring licenses for wharf and weir
erection in 1876 (326) .

Besides being less comprehensive in

its coverage than the New Jersey and Massachusetts
enactments,

the Maine law required no lease or purchase of

the lands underlying the proposed structures prior to 1975,
even if state tidelands were involved . The 1975 Submerged
Lands" Act provided for the lease of lands beneath both
existing and proposed tideland developments (327).
Even more

interest~ngly,

Maine apparently did not see

the need to regUlate the filling of its tidelands until 1967
(328),

by Which 't i me its counterparts had been managing

tideland fill for over fifty years.

This difference in the

treatment of tideland filling perhaps can be attributed to
the less industrialized nature of Maine.
reason,

Whatever the

Maine was still achieving the second stage

innovations while New Jersey was struggling into the third
stage of the tideland law progression.
The third stage was stimulated by the increasing
awareness of the unique and irreplaceable qualities of
tidelands which began in the 1960's .

It is at this stage

that there has been substantial digression between the three
states' treatment of tideland development .

The states are

similar in that by this time each has strict permitting
re~uirements

which must be complied with before any

development can occur below the high water mark
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(329)---whether the improvement be the erection of a small
residential dock or the filling of acres of tidelands for a
condominium complex.

And all three states have decided to

retain their interest in illegally developed tidelands which
are still SUbject to the tidal flow (330)-- such tidelands
as those underlying improperly built wharves .

The

difference among the states is in their treatment of
tidelands filled wi t h ou t the appropriate governmental
permission during the second stage of the tideland law
progression.
The third phase reached New

~ersey

first when,

in 1959,

the state claimed privately developed meadowlands (331),
Despite several ensuing proposals to release illegally.
filled tidelands of long standing to their purported' private
owners (332),

it was not until

1981 that a coherent approach

to the tidelands problem evidenced itself .

Prior to 1981

the state Department of Environmental Protection
unilaterally had embarked upon its own attempt to map all of
the state's tidelands under the auspices of a legislative
mandate to map New

~ersey's

meadowlands (333),

After the

passage of the 1981 constitutional amendment (334) and the
promulgation of subsequent court decisions interpreting it
(335),

it was clear that New Jersey had decided to claim as

much of its illegally filled tidelands as it could in a
limited period of time (336)'

The state then would sell

those tidelands to their present occupants (337) .
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Massachusetts.

in contrast,

continued no-sale policy

or

its second phase of tideland law development into the third .
Although its legislature seriously considered extinguishing
the public's interest in illegally filled tidelands.

so that

purported private owners would hold title in fee simple
absolute (338))

the legislature instead decided to continue

a combined licensing-leasing approach (339).

Thus the

commonwealth intends to charge for the use of its unlawfully
filled tidelands as
(340),

i~

they had been lawfully developed

Massachusetts has yet clearly to establish the

ownership status of either its legally or illegally
developed tidelands.
Maine was the only one of the three northeastern states
examined which not only considered releasing the state's
rights in illegally filled tidelands to their purported
private owners,

but actually did so (341) ,

It is somewhat

surprising that this action has yet to be challenged in
Maine's courts,

since this approach was SUfficiently charged

politically for the other two states to reject it.

The next

section of this paper will discuss such recurrent overtones
which arise in balancing the public and private interests in
illegally developed tidelands.

RECURRENT THEMES IN TIDELAND DEVELOPMENT LAW
The overriding concern of the three states examined

herein when dealing with the tideland ownership issue is
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clearing title to the land (342).
claims are being publicized.

Now that state tideland

no potential buyer of tidelands

will purchase the property if there is a possible state
interest in the land (343) .

Lack of marketable title

results in political activity by the purported private
owners,

which eventually concludes with legislative action .

Thus two of the three states studied,
Massachusetts,

the third being

have clarified the title issue.

The political nature of the decision-making process
concerning how to treat illegally developed tidelands is
apparent from the raft of tideland proposals the states
considered before adopting their current s c h ame s (344)'

The

decision is made more explosive by the inherent conflict
which exists between the expectations of private riparian
owners and the public rights involved.

Often private

shorefront owners developed their adjacent tidelands in good
faith,

without knowledge that a state license was required.

And even if the developers themselves did not act in good
faith,

they frequently sold to unsuspecting buyers who never

dreamed they were purchasing illegally filled tidelands
(345) .

Balanced against these private expectations are the
public rights in tidelands which date back to colonial times
(346)'

It seems unJust fair that the public at large should

give up its interest in valuable tidelands for the benefit
of a fortunately placed few .

The public rights are
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especially significant now that the amount of publicly held
coastal lands has dwindled,

and the importance of this tidal

buffer between the land and sea and biological breeding
ground has been recognized (347).
Nevertheless,

it is understandable that ·the purported

private owners of developed tidelands feel preJudiced by
virtue of the fact that the states have waited

50

long to

consider asserting their claims against the private
landholders.

If another private party held

the tidelands instead of the state,

legal title to

the doctrine of adverse

possession would operate to extinguish the original owner's
right for failure to assert it within a reasonable period of
time <348>'
theories,

Adverse possession,

however,

state (349),

and other

e~uitable

generally do not operate against the

especially where the state is holding the

public's interest in trust (350)'

The general theory is

that the price of allowing the state,

by

inaction,

to divest

the public of its interest in favor of a private party is

too high.
The more intangible public benefits which are lost if
the state decided to release its interest in illegally
filled tidelands is not all that has to be considered.

The

monetary issues have to be factored into the decision as
we 11 .

The financial considerations are especially important

in the case of New Jersey,

where tideland revenues

constitutionally have been dedicated to the support of the
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public schools since 1844 (351) .

If New

~ersey

legislators

and its citizenry had approved the proposed constitutional
amendment extinguishing all of the state's interest in
illegally filled tidelands of long standing (352),

the

school fund would have lost a substantial chunk of money.
Since no state grants would have been required to clear
title to these lands,

no purchase monies would have been

forthcoming.
Whether the State of New Jersey,

on balance,

has gained

Dr lost money by deciding to claim title to its filled
tidelands in unclear.

It must have been very costly to map

the state's possibly filled tidelands.
of the study (353),

publish the results

as well as now process grant

applications and litigate contested claims (354) .

One

wonders whether the state might nct be taking money cut of
the Department of Environmental Protection's pocket and
putting it in the public school fund's pocket.

Even New

Jersey has limits on the revenues it can spend on tideland
claims,

as is evidenced by its decision not to pursue claims

against private landholders unconcerned with clearing the
title to their property (355) .
The costs of asserting the state's claims to unlawfully
filled tidelands also played a major role in the development
of tideland strategy in Massachusetts and Maine.

Although

Massachusetts has not resolved its tideland issue totally,
it

has decided not to pursue its claims against already
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existing illegal tideland development (356),

Instead.

it

will wait for the developers to come to the state under its
new permitting procedure (357).
In Maine.

the ba 'lancing of monetary costs and benefits

was even mOTe evident than in New Jersy or Massachusetts.
Thus Maine's highest court declared that its legislature
"reasonably could conclude that case-by-case resolution of
the existing problem--whether by legislative.
administrative,

or Judicial action--would be costly.

time-consuming. and ineffective" (358)'

especially taking

into account the fact that the municipalities who have
relied on thE.> filled lands as part of their tax base "can
'i l l afford to lose,
over.

or be thrown into extended litigation

those established sources of revenue." (359)
Although Maine and New Jersey decided to resolve their

tideland problems in apparently opposite fashions,

with

Maine releasing its public rights and New Jersey asserting
its public rights.

both approaches were characterized by

their opponents as "giveaways ." (360)'

This criticism was

levied because neither state chose to assert its rights to
illegally filled tidelands in perpetuity.
for the purported private owner.
this condemnation.

without recourse

Massachusetts has avoided

probably because it has yet to reach a

final decision as to who owns its improperly filled
tidelands.
approach.

The reasonableness of this Massachusetts
when compared with the conclusiveness of New
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Jersey's and Maine's tidelands treatment will be discused in
the next section .

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY TREATMENT OF TIDELAND DEVELOPMENT
From the foregoing study of the statutory schemes in
the three states there apparently is little question that
these states have retained (361),
retain,

and should continue to

their interest in those tidelands still subject to

the tidal flow,

whether or not the tidelands support

privately-erected structures.

Anyone buying a private

structure located upon these lands is on notice that the
underlying property consists of tidelands,
possi ~ly

and therefore is

subJect to state claims.

More worthy of examination is the best statutory
approach to the ownership of illegally filled tidelands.
Two prerequisites of an ideal scheme are that it
conclusively establishes ownership rights in the tidelands,
and that it attains a balance between the expectations of
private holders of illegally filled tidelands and the
public's interest.
The enactment which comports most fully with both of
these requirements is New Jersey's tideland law.

New

Jersey's statutory scheme reaffirms the state's interest in
illegally filled tidelands,

while allowing private "owners"

an opportunity to obtain clear title to their filled
tidelands (362).

Moreover,

the New Jersey

legi5lati~n

was
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the subject of a voter reFerendum (363), a must even for a
nonconstitutional issue because of the magnitude of the
public interest at stake.

New
however.

~ersey's

tideland approach can be improved upon,

For i nstanc 8,

th e rate of c omp ensa"t i on a pr i vate

party must pay to extinguish the state's interest in "his"
land should be mandated by legislative enactment in order to
ensure evenhanded treatment of all riparian owners (364).
Moreover,

a special expedited and inexpensive appeals

process shOUld be established for tideland claims so private
parties can contest the designation of their lands in a
rapid and inexpensive hearing (365).
should not be

50

The appeals process

onerous that it is cheaper and easier to

pay the state to clear one's title than to contest the
property's designation .

The ensuing discussion will explore

the ramifications of this proposal for the disposition of
illegally filled tidelands.
Since one of the primary factors responsible for the
enactment of statutes to untangle tideland ownership status
is to clarify title claims,

an important requirement for a

:uccessful scheme is that it conclusively address the
ownersh i P issue.

The New

~ersey

clearly resolves this question,

and Maine legislation
but the Massachusetts

legislation enacted to date lacks the predictable quality
(366) .
While the leasing approach of the Massachusetts
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legislation is initially appealing because it does not
alienate the lands from the public,

a leasing scheme without

a resolution of the title issue does not resolve anything.
All it does is postpone until the end of the lease term the
inevitable decision of what to do regarding tidelands title.
The alternatives to leasing are to give or sell the
tidelands to their purported private owners,

or eJect the

current private landholders in favor of the state.
choice is overly harsh,

The last

as it ignores the fact that most

private owners do not know they hold illegally filled
tidelands (367),

Moreover the approach would enrich the

state unjustly through the acqUisition of overlying land and
buildings for which it did not pay,

a major consideration

since some of the prime downtown real estate in such port
cities as Boston and Portland consist of illegally filled
tidelands (368).

Finally,

the public interest which the

state is supposedly protecting has been extinguished in
these lands.
navigation,

at least in the traditional sense.

No

fishing or waterfowling can take place on filled

tidelands.
Extinguishing the public interest in illegally filled
tidelands without any compensation to the state swings too
far towards the opposite extreme.

Using an approach similar

to Maine's results in marginal public benefits at best;
clear title for a relatively few landholders,
revenues to municipalities.

continued tax

and savings in time and money
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since the state's claims do not have to be identifiied
<369> .

Private landholders stand to reap the greatest

benefit under such a scheme,
public loses an invaluable.

gaining clear title.

while the

although certainly altered,

resource without any recompense.

The

maintenance-of-town-tax-revenues arguement hardly seems a
convincing reason for giving away state lands.

As for the

fact that the identification of state claims is an expensive
and time-consuming process,

this is a given .

Nevertheless.

it is a task that is necessary for any comprehensive coastal
resource management scheme.

Lack of past enforcement of

tidelands law is no excuse for giving up current tideland
claims.

In making the choice to identify these lands.

however,

the cost of the proJect should be acknowledged.

The only option left is the New Jersey approach :
assert the state's tideland claims,

to

allowing good faith

landholders to purchase grants from the state if it is
determined that their land consists of unlawfUlly filled
tidelands (370) .

No time limit should be set on the mapping

process as long as the affected tidelands are identified
within a reasonable time.

There is no need to impose New

Jersey's referendum-inspired

arti~icial cutof~

upon an

idealized statute (371).
A presumption should be established that unless it can
be shown that a private property holder filled the tidelands
he claims himself,

or that the tidelands were filled within
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the past ten to fifteen years by someone else,
Ta i t h n

1an d hoI d e r

( 372 ) .

he is a ngood

This des i 9 nat ion wi 11 en tit 1 e the

landholder to obtain clear title to his illegally filled
tidelands at a legislatively mandated percentage of the
property's fair market value,

not taking into account any

privately-erected improvements thereon.

The state will be

required to convey title to him at the mandated price in
order to facilitate similar treatment of persons in like
situations .

If,

however,

faith" landholder,

a private party is not a "good

the state will have the option of whether

to sell him a grant,

and if so,

at what price.

Any money from the state tideland grants will go into
the state coffers,

thus benefiting the public at least

marginally and offsetting the costs of asserting state
claims.

Thus the public will be compensated somewhat for

the alienation of its interest, while good faith landholders
will not be taxed excessively.
It may be desirable to impose a time limit within which
a private landholder has to clear title to his property.
after which full title will be held by the state.
result,

at some point in time,

completely resolved.

the title

issue will be

The period allowed the property holder

to obtain a grant should be relatively long,
seventy-five years,

As a

e. g.

so that he has sufficient time to raise

any portion of the purchase price he lacks.
In addition,

an expedited,

ine lCpensive hearing or
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appeals process should be established so that landholders
can challenge the designation of their property as illegally
filled tidelands.

This process might avoid the incongruous

results of the New Jersey scheme,

where apparently it is

cheaper and easier to pay the state to clear a potentially
clouded title than to challenge a questionable state claim
(373).

Abuse of the hearing process can be avoided by

allowing for the assessment of the state's court costs and
attorney fees against a private challenger if the hearings
officer determines the private party brought a frivolous
claim .
Finally,

because of the widespread effect any decision

by the state to give away.

sell or retain illegally fi :lled

tidelands in which the state may have an interest,

any

proposal for these lands should be put before the electorate
for vote .

The ramifications of disposing of the state's

tideland interests are too great to leave this issue to
legislators subJect to partisan influence.

CONCLUSION
It is obvious that the three northeastern states
investigated in this study have decided on different
statutory treatments of illegally filled tidelands.
is no one correct

res~lution

There

of the tidelands issue,

although an idealized approach has been set forth in this
paper .

Rather,

each state must balance the competing public
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~nd

private interests in the state's tidelands,

after taking

into account the state's own historic treatment of

tidelands.

Then the state can determine its own best

solution to the issues raised by illegally developed
tidelands.
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same,

and when so built on or improved,

to

appropriate the same to his own exclusive
use.

Leonard L

State Highway Dep't, 24 N. J .
Super.
376, 94
aff' d , 29 N. J.
Sup er.
188, 102 A. 2d 97
CAppo
Div .
1953) (P.
L.
1851. p.
335>'
Section eleven
defined "shore" as the land between ordinary high and low
tide.
.!JL...

A. 2d 530,

532-33,

(45) Matthews ~ Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N. J.
306, 471 A.2d 355, 362 N.J.
(1984);
O'Neill v.
State
Highway Dep't, 50 N.J.
307,235 A.2d L
10 (1967) (both
citing P. L.
1869, c.
383, sec.
3, p.
1018"
The
tidelands involved were the Hudson River, New York Bay and
Ki 11 von Kull.
Matthews Y..... Bay Head Improvement Ass 'n, 95
N. J.
306~
471 A.2d 355, 362 n.5 (1984).

(46) Matthews ~ Bay Head Improvement Ass'n, 95 N. J.
306, 471 A.2d 355, 362 n.5 (1984);
O'Neill ~ State
Highway Oep't, 50 N. J.
307, 235 A.2d I, 10 (1967) (both
citing P . L.
1891, c.
124, sec.
3, p .
216 (codified as
amended at N. J.
Stat.
Ann.
sec.
12:
3-4 (West 1979».
The repealing statute expressly stated that it did not
revive any local common law N. J.
Stat.
Annat.
sec .
12:

3-4 (West 1979>'

(47) O'Neill ~
A.2d 1,10 (1967);

State Highway Oep't, 50 N. J .
N. J.
Stat.
Ann.
sec.
12:

307, 235
3-4 (West
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1979>'
The statute also provided that any power given
corporations to buy, fill or erect wharves upon tidelands or
any grants of underwater land were not repealed.
l...!t
(48) O'Neill y.....
L
10 (1967);
1979) .

A.2d

State Highway Dep 'tJ 50 N. .J .
307, 235
stat.
Ann.
sec.
12: 3-4 <West

N. J.

(49) Seacoast Real Estate Co .
~
American Timber Co .•
EQ..
219, 113 A.
489, 490 (1920) (citing P. L.
1891, p.216).
This power s ince has passed to the New .Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection.
See N . .J.
Stat.
Ann .
sec.
12;
3-4 (West 1979)J as modified by the
reorganization of state government reflected in~.
at sec.
13:
1D-1.

92 N. .J.

(50) Matthews ~ Bay Head Improvement Ass'n,
306, 471 A.2d 355. 362 n.5 (1984) .

95 N. .J.

(51) See O'Neill ~ State Highway Dep't •.
50 N . .J.
307,
235 A.2d L 11 (1967);
Dickinson L
Fund for the Support
of Free Public Schools. 187 N. J.
Super.
224. 454 A.2d 491,
493 (1982). rev'd, 95 N.J.
65, 469 A.2d 1 (1983)
(hereinafter cited as Dickinson 1 ).

(52)
A. 2d 1.

O'Neill y.:..
11

State Highway Dep't,

50 N. .J .

307,

235

(1967).

(53) Of c k i nson "l..L supra note 51, 454 A. 2d at 493.
Properties that were once tidally flowed and considered
valueless when initially filled include the Hackensack
Meadowlands, where the Meadowlands Sport Complex cu~rently
is located, and Atlantic City property where casinos
presently stand.
See infra notes 68 and 95 and accompanying
text.

(54) MoreoverJ the public increasingly was concerned that
the state receive compensation for any tidelands put to
private use, since any rents or purchase monies received
from the riparian lands are used to support the public
schools.
See infra notes 56-58 and accompanying t .ext .
(55) One current activist is Farleigh Dickinson. Jr., who
leads the Save the School Fund Committee in its battle to
assure that state tidelands are not given away.
See, e . g . }
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Dickinson ~ Fund fRL the Support Ri Free Public Schools,
187 N. J.
Super.
320, 454 A.2d 480 (Lalli Div.), rev'd, 187
N. J .
Super.
224, 454 A.2d 491 CAppo
Div.
1982), rev'd,
95 N. J.
65, 469 A.2d 1 (1983).
Because money from the
lease and sale of these lands is placed into a fund to
support public schools, he is afraid that "'[wJe will,
inadvertently, sell the next generation of school children
down the river. ,,, Moore, Water. Water Everywhere, N. J.
Monthly, Nov.
1982, at 76 (quoting Farleigh Dickinson, Jr.,
Chairman of Save the School Fund Committee).
For a
discussion
of
-t
h
e
school
fund,
see
infra
notes
56-60 and
.
accompanying text.

--

307,
<56) O'Neill ~ State Highway Dep't. 50 N.J.
A.2d 1, 8 (1967) (citing P.
L.
1894. c.
71. p. 123).

235

(57) N. J.
Stat.
Ann.
sec.
lBA:
56-5 to -6 (West 1968
and Sup p .
1983-1984) i
Oi c k i nson v .
Fund for th e Sup port
of ~ Public Schools, 95 N. J.
65, 469 A.2d 1, 11 (1983)
(hereinafter cited as Dickinson Il).

(58) Dickinson ~ supra note 57, 469 A.2d at I i i
N. J.
Canst.
of 1947 art.
VI I J, sec.
i v. para.
2.
The
IV, sec.
vi i. para .
6, had a
Constitution of 1844, art.
similar provision .
O'Neill ~ state Highway Dep't, 50 N. J.
307, 235 A.2d 1, 8 (1967).

(59) Garrett
542, 545 (1972),

~

State,

118 N. J.

Super.

594,

289 A.2d

(60) N. J.
Canst .
of 1947 art.
VI I I, sec.
i v. para.
2.
As of 1982, the interest from the fund constituted only
several million of New Jersey's annual two billion dollar
budget for school aid.
N. Y.
Times, Oct.
24. 1982. sec.
11, at 1, col.
3.

(61) Porro and Teleky, Marshland Title Dilemma:
~ T i da l
Phenomenon, 3 Seton Hall L.
Rev.
323, 325 and n.8 (1972)
(citing Sissleman ~ State Highway Dep't, No.
A 769-59
(N. J.
Super.
Ct.
App.
Div., May 1. 1961».
(62) Porro and Te Le k q .
(63) See

ilL.

(supra note 61,

at 325. )
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( 64 ) Die kin son 1. 5 U P l' a not e 5 L 454 A. 2 d at 508
(Michels, J., dissenting) (citing Sissleman Y.:-. State
App.
Highway Dep 't, No.
A 769-59 (N . J.
Super .
Ct .
May 1, 1964),
(65) Dickinson lL supra note 51,
(Michels, J, dissenting).

1),

Div. ,

454 A.2d at 509

(66) See i!. I Porro, Meadowlands Owners' Dilemma (pt.
N.J.
St.
B.J.
Fall 1967, at 15. 1"5.

(67) See Porro, The Jersey Meadows:
Who Owns Them? Who
i.Q. Control Them?, 1968 N. J .
St.
B. J.
143, 143
(hereinafter cited as Porro. The Jersey Meadows).
Among
these commissions were the Meadowlands Regional Development
Agency, an or.ganization of thirteen municipalities formed in
1959, and the Commission to Study Meadowland Development, a
group appointed by the 1963 Legislature.
~
(68)

l.!L...

(69) See Dickinson 1L supra note 51, 454 A.2d at 509
(Michels. J., dissenting);
Po r-r o , Meadowlands Owners'
Dilemma (pt.1), supra 66, at 16;
Porro, The Jersey Meadows.
supra note 67, at 143. 173-74 .

(70) POrrO, Meadowlands Owners' Dilemma (pt .1).
not e 66, a t 1 6.

(71)

Por r-o,

The Jersey Meadows,

supra note 67,

supra

at 143.

(72) .!lL..
(73) See

i.sL....

(74) Porro, Meadowlands Owners' 'Di l e mma (pt . 1), supra
note 66, at 16.
A state senate concurrent resolution
proposed a constitutional amendment prOViding that the state
have no title to tidal lands where a continuous line of
record title to the land could be established for the past
thirty years and where taxes had been assessed on it for the
past twenty.
l.!L....
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(75) Porro, The versey Meadows, supra note 67, at 173-74.
The constitutional amendment suggested by Senate Concurrent
Resolution 41 allowed for private ownership of tidal lands
where a person could establish a continuous line or record
title to the property since 1891 and that taxes had been
assessed on the land for the past twenty years.
~
(76) See Dickinson !L supra note 51, 454 A.2d at 509
(Michels. J ., dissenting);
Sax, The Public Trust Doctrine
in Natural Resource Law:
Effective vudicial Intervention,
68 Mich.
L.
Rev.
471, 482 n.36 (1970).
Governer Hughes
filed suit to stop balloting on the 1968 amendment, with the
result being a removal of the ~uestion from the ballot.
~
(77) Sax, supra note 76, at 482 n. 36;
Note,
Citizen Rights. supra note 5, at 572 and n.7 .
(78) Dickinson
_y~~~tel::!ig. w~.Y.

State

~ supra note 57,
at 5 (quoting O'Neill
DeI! 't;, 50 N. J.
307, 320, 235 A.2d 1, 6

( 1967) ) .

(79) Dickinson ~ supra note 57, 469 A. 2d at 5;
01 c k i nson !L supra note 51, 454 A. 2d a t 509 (M i c h e Is,
dissenting) (both citing N. J .
Stat .
Ann.
sees.
13: 1B-13, 1 to -13.6).

J. ,

(80) A reorganization of the state government resulted in
the Tidelands Resource Council succeeding the Natural
Resources Council, N. J.
Stat.
Ann.
sec ,
13:
10-3 (West
Supp.
1983-1984), which itself was a successor of the
Resource Development Council.
l.!L... (West 1979). The
Department of Environmental Protection was the offspring of
the Department of Conservation and Economic Development.
l.fL.... at Sec.
13:
1D-1 ( Wes t 1979 ) .
(81)

~

at sec.

13 :

IB-13.2 (West 1979).

(82) ~ at sec.
13:
IB-13.1(a>.
See Dickinson 11..L.
supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 6;
Porro. The Three Faces of
O'Neill, N.J.
St.
B.J. • Winter 1968, at 55,81.
(83) N. J.
1984-1985) .

Stat.

Ann.

sec.

13:

1B-13.4 (West Supp.
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(84)

50 N. J .

307,

235

A.2d 1 (1967).

<a5) ~
at 323, 235 A.2d at 9.
In determining the mean
high tide mark, the court believed that the average of all
high tides over 18.6 years should be used, if possible.
~
at 234, 235 A. 2d at 9-10.

(86) ~, 235 A.2d at 10.
For a discussion of the Wharf
Act. and the local custom which i t codified, see supra notes
39-44 and accompanying text .

(87)

235 A. 2d at 10.

307,

50 N. J.

(88) ~
The state generally has no claim to tidal lands
that become upland by natural accretion or reliction;
such
lands belong to the abutting riparian owner.
See Borough of
Wildwood Crest ~ Masciarella. 51 N. J.
352, 240 A.2d 655,
677-68

(1968).

(89) See O'Neill,

50 N.J.

(90) City Q.f. Newark L
N. J.

530,

414 A . 2d

(91) N.J.
(92)

1304,

Stat.

Ann.

307.

235 A.2d at 11.

Natural Resources Council,
(1 980 >.

82

131 0

sec ..

IB-13.5 (West 1979).

13 :

.!JL....

(93) Dickinson !!L supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 6 (citing
Dept.
of Envtl.
Protection Admin.
Order No.
34
(.Ju 1 Y 26, 1973» .

N. J.

(94) Dickinson
(95)

(96)

at 73,

Wall St.
Duffy,
97.

(97) lJL....

~

supra note 57,

J.,

Oct.

11.

469 A.2d at 6.

1982,

Rights and Wrongs,

N. J.

at 23.
Month ly,

For instance Playboy Enterprises.

Nov.

Inc .

1982,

paid
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the state a nonrefundable $694,000 over one disputed acre of
land, and agreed to pay a total of $4.6 million if the state
suported its claim in court .
Wall St.
J. J Oct.
11, 1982,
a~ 23.
The state never made a claim, but as provided in the
agreement, retained the $694,000 .
1JL.

(98) Moore,

supra note 55,

at 76 .

(99) Dickinson LlL supra note 57.

469 A.2d at 6.

(100) Dickinson !L supra note 51.

454 A.2d at 494.

( 101) Moore,

supra note 55 ,

at 76.

( 102) Di c k i nson .L.... supra note 51,
(103) Die k in50n

454 A. 2d at 496.

.!.L.... supra note 57. 469 A.2d at 7.

( 104) .!iL...., 469 A. 2d at 3, 7 (quat i ng N. J.
Canst.
of
1947 art .
VIII; sec.
v , para .
1, as amended Nov.
3,
1981>.
The language of the amendment. in full. is as
follows:

No lands that were formerly tidal
flowed, but which have not been tidal
flowed at any time for a period of 40
years, shall be deemed riparian lands,
or lands subject to a riparian claim.
and the passage of that period shall
be a good and sufficient bar to any
such claim. unless during that period
the State has specifically defined and
asserted such a claim pursuant to law.
This section shall apply to lands which
have not been tidal flowed at an~ time
during the 40 years immediately preceding
adoption of this amendment with respect
to any claim not specifically defined
and asserted by the State within 1 year
of the adoption of this adm·endment .
N. J .
Canst.
of 1947 art.
VIII, sec.
Vi
para.
1.
amend ed Nov.
3, 1981).

(105) Dickinson

IlL

supra note 57.

469 A.2d at 3.

as

7
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(c it i ng N. J.
Canst.
of 1947 art.
VI 11. sec.
v , para.
1,
as amended Nov.
3. 1981>'
In an attempt to generate the
state governer's support. the original amendment was revised
to allow for the one year grace period.
Moore, supra note
55, at 76.

(106)

Dickinson

~

supra note 57,

469 A.2d at 6-7.

(107) !JL.....
(108) Dickinson LL supra note 51,

454 A.2d at 495.

(109) See i.!L.... Since N. J .
Stat.
Ann.
sec.
13:
lE-13.5 (West 1979), allowing for administrative and
Judicial review of state tideland claims, was promulgated
solely for the meadowlands, it may not be applicable to
other tidelands.
See Dickinson l.!..L supra note 57, 469 A.2d
at 6;
LeCompte x; state. 128 N. J.
Super .
552, 320 A.2d
876, 881 (1974) .
After O'Neill, housever. it is clear that
an upland owner can institute a ~uiet title suit against the
state without specific statutory authority .
See 235 A.2d at
5.

(110) N. J.
Stat .
Ann.
sec.
12:
3-4 (West 1979); as
modified by the reorganization of state governemnt reflected
i n iJL.... at 5 e C .
13:
1 D-1.

St.

(111) Dickinson ~ supra note 57,
J.} Oct.
11. 1982, at 23, 30.

469 A.2d at 7;

( 112) Die kin s on .!..L... sup ran 0 t e 57,

469 A. 2 d a t

Wall

7.

(113) Dickinson ~ supra note 51. 454 A.2d at 496 .
Some
people believed that the amendment would give away a
priceless asset of the state and its educational system, as
well as Jeopardize the credi~ rating of school bonds secured
by monies received from riparian grants and leases.
Wall
St.
J.} Oct.
11, 1982, at 23, 30.
Environmetalists who
opposed the amendment thought the constitutional changes
would threaten the management of tideland development.
~
(114) Dickinson .!....L supra note 51,

454 A.2d at 496.
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(115) GormlelJ v .
Han, 88 N. J.
26, 438 A.2d 519 (1981).
The Supreme Court held the interpretive statement worded by
the Attorney General was unfair, and suggested a different
statement for use.
1.L

(116) Dickinson ~ Fund for the Support of Free Fublic
Schools, 187 N. J.
Super.
320, 454 A.2d 480 CLaw Div . ),
Di v.
1982),
r e v d , 187 N. J.
Super.
224, A.2d 491 CAppo
rev'd, 95 N.J.
65, 469A.2d 1 (1983) .
r

(117) Dickinson ~ supra note 51, 454 A.2d at 496 .
The
vote was 864,445 for, and 756,220 against approval.
l.!L..

1,

C118) N. J.
Canst.
as amend ed Nov.
3,

of 1947 art .
1981.

VI I I,

sec.

v , para.

(119) Wall St.
J., Oct.
11, 1982, at 23.
About thirty
percent of the state's area was being :i n v e s t i g a t e d for
potential claims.
l.!L..

(120) Dickinson l!L supra note 57,
(121) See
(122) N. Y.

~

469 A.2d at 9.

at 8.

Times.

oc t.

23,

at 29.

30.

(123) Dickinson .!..!.L supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 10-11.
The state utilized the mapping procedure it had been
required to use when making meadowlands claims in asserting
all of its valid tideland claims.
1.L at 8.
It thus met
the specific deliniation requirement of the amendment by
designating the places where the tide had flowed on more
generalized maps of the areas investigated ror tidal claims.
~
at 11.
The assertion re~uirement was met by filing the
maps bearing tidal designations with the Secretary of State
and county and municipal clerks.
~
(124) N. Y.

Times,

Oct,

23,

1982,

at 29,

30.

(125) Dickinson ~ supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 10-11.
The state did not meet the specific deliniation requirement
for the Delaware tidal region when it submitted maps of
areas suspected of possibly containing tidelands, without
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designating a line of tidal flow.
1JL... Nor did the state
really believe it had met the amendment's mandate in filing
these maps, according to the trial testimony of both the
Attorney General and the chairman of the Tidelands Resource
Caunc i 1.
.!JL.... at 10 .
(126)

lJL.....

at 14.

(127) See Moore,

supra note 55.

at 76.

(128) See .i.!:L(129) Wall St .

J .,

Oct.

1L

1982,

at 23,

30.

(130) Editorial. N. Y.
Times. Oct.
30, 1982, at 26, col.
1.
According to a New York Times editorial, 224 claims were
settled during the ten year span, with the average cost to
the homeowner being $1,722.
l.!L...

(131) N. Y.
Times, Nov.
7, 1982, at 53, col.
1;
N. Y.
Times, Oct.
24, 1982, sec.
11, at 1.
This view probably
stemmed from a New Jersey appellate court decision which
held that the compensation a riparian owner should pay for a
tidelands grant was the fair market value of the property.
See LeCompte ~ State, 128 N. J.
Super.
552, 320 A.2d 876,
881 (1974>'
In LeCompte, a riparian owner who had filled
tidelands while his grant application was pending was
charged the fair market value of the tideland property at
the tim e 0 f con v e y a nee.
1..!L.. a t 878, 881. Sin c e h e had
already improved lands at the time of the conveyance, having
~illed them in,
subdivided them, installed water lines.
sewer systems and roads. he was charged the fair market
value of the property in its improved state.
~
(132) See Moore, supra note 55, at 76;
N.Y.
7, 1982, at 53. col.
1;
N. Y.
Times, Dc t.
23,
29, col.
5.
(133) Wall St .
J., Oct.
Times, Oct.
Editorial. N. Y.
(134) Duffy,
Or t .
1 1, 1982,

11, 1982, at 23, 30.
Contra
1.
30. 1982, at 26, col.

supra note 96,

at 23 .

Times, Nov.
1982, at

at 95.

See Wall St.

.J . ,
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(135) Moore, ~ ~ note 55,
1982. at 53. col. 1.

(136) N.Y.

Times,

Oct.

at

24,

1982,

Times,

N. Y.

76;

sec .

11.

Nov.

at 1.

7.

The

proposed amendment would have added a second paragraph to
the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 art VIII,
N. J.
Stat .
Ann.
Canst .
art VIII, sec.
v,
(West Supp 1983-1984).

Times, Oct.

( 137) N. Y.

(138) Moore,

supra note 55,

N. Y .

(140) DUffy,

(141) N. Y.

24,

1982,

Times, Oct.

sec.

11.

1982,

sec.

sec .

11.

at 1.

at 76 .

Times, Oct.

supra note 96.

sec.
v.
See
annat.
2

24,

11.

at 96.

24,

1982,

at 1.

(142) N. Y.
Times, Nov .
7, 1982, at 53, col.
1.
vote was 990, 161 against and 627,088 in favor of the
amendment.

at 1.

The

.!lL-.

( 143) N. Y.

Times, Nov .

7,

1982,

at

53,

co!.

1.

( 144) 1JL....

(145) Telephone interview with Joann Cubberley,
Jersey Tidelands Resource Council (June 7, 1984) .
(146)

!L

(147)

See,

L!L-'

N. Y.

Times,

Nov.

7,

1982,

New

at 53,

col.

1.

( 148) Di c: k i nson 1L supra note 51, 454 A. 2d at 504.
also Dickinson ~ supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 5 n.3 .
(149) Di c k i nson

1L supra

note 51,

454 A. 2d at 504 .

See
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(150) Telephone interview with Joann Cubberley,

supra

note 145.

(151) N. J.
1984-1985) .

Stat.

Ann.

sec .

13:

1E-13 (West Supp.

(152) Telephone interview with Joann Cubberley, supra
note 145.
In order to give approval of a grant or lease
application under ·N.J.
Stat .
Ann .
·s e c .
13:
1E-13.9
(West 1979), the Tidelands Resource Council must be
satisfied that the grant or lease is in the public interest,
including in its calculations the environmental impact of
the proposed use .
~
Since this statute was part of the
meadowlands enactments, it is arguable that it does not
apply to nonmeadowlands .
See Dickinson l.L.... supra note 57,
469 A.2d at 6;
LeCompte Y..:.... State, 128 N.,J .
Super.
552,
320 A.2d 876, 881 (1974).
If it does not, the proper
standard of review for riparian lands which are not
meadowlands would be an earlier statute whicb is still in
effect.
N. J.
Stat.
Ann.
sec.
12:
3-10 <West 1979> only
requires the Council to consider the effect of the action on
navigation.
~
The Tidelands Resource Council apparently
is the relevant granting authority for the latter statute,
as well.
See P.
L.
1919, ch.
233, sec.
3, p .
568, as
modified by P.
L.
1945, ch .
22. sec.
29, as repealed by
P.
L.
1979, c h .
386, sec.
4.
The reader is rererred by
N. J.
Stat.
Ann.
sec.
13:
lA-29 (West Supp.
1983-84) to
i..!L.. at sec.
13:
18-13 (West Supp 1984-1985), where
reference is made to the Tidelands Resource Council.
('153) Telephone interview with Joann Cubberley, supra
note 145 .
N. J.
Stat.
Ann.
sec.
13:
1'8-13.9 <West 1979)
directs the Tidelands Resource Council, in fixing the price
to be charged for a lease or conveyance of lands owned by
the state, to take into consideration "the actions of a
claimant under' color of title who in good faith made
improvements or paid taxes, or both, on the lands in
question." ~ Although this statute arguably applies only
to meadowlands, and not to all tidelands, Dickinson !.L...
supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 6;
LeCompte x; State, 128 N. J.
Super.
552, 320 A.2d 876, 881 (1974), it seems to be the
guide currently used by the Council .
This is logical since
the older statutory directive concerning the setting of the
consideration paid for tidelands is less specific ("such
compensation ... as shall be determined by the b o e r d "} and
does not contemplate the possibility of good faith
landholders of filled tidelands attempting to clear tideland
title.
See N. J.
Stat .
Ann.
sec.
12:
3-10 (West 1979)
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(154) Telephone interview with
note 145.
( 155) N. Y.
St.
J ., OCt.

Times, Oct.
23,
11, 1982, at 23,

~oann

1982,

(157) Telephone interview with
note 145.
N.~.

Canst.

at 29,

col.

supra

5;

Wall

30.

(156) Dickinson .!.l.L supra note 57,

( 158)

Cubberley,

469 A.2d at 13 n. 14

~oann

of 1947 art VI I 1.

Cubberley,

sec.

iv,

supra

para.

2.

(159) See N. Y.
Times, Oct .
24, 1982, sec .
11. at 1,
col.
5.
As of 1982. the interest from the Fund comprised
only a few million of the two billion dollars New ~ersey
spent annually on the school aid .
~
(160) Supra notes 101-107 and 117-126 and accompanying
te x t .
(161) If the property had been tidelands within the past
forty years, under the 1981 constitutional amendment any
state claim to the land would not be precluded until forty
yeaT'S afteT' the land attained its nontidal state .
See N.~.
Canst.
of 1947 art.
VII. sec .
5, para.
1. as amended
Nov.
3
1 981 ;
sup ran 0 t e l 04.
I

(162) SupT'a notes 147-154 and accompanying text.
(163) Supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
(164) Ward Sand and Materials Co.
~
Palmer, 51 N.~.
51, 237 A.2d 619. 624 (1968).
Where tidelands had been
reclaimed under the authority of the Wharf Act of 1851, but
subsequently were ro e i n un d a t e d for over fifty years, the
reasonable time allowed a private owner to reexclude the
tide had long since lapsed.
~
Title to the land vested
in the state.
!.L
(165) See

sup~a

note 49 and accompanying text.
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(i66) See Universit.y of Mainel

(167) Boston Waterfront Dev.
378 Mass .

supra note 181

Corp .

~

at 188.

Commonwealth.

393 N. E. 2d 356 (1979>.
The companies
"absolute propert~ in the land within the limits or
629.

633,

received
the charter," as well as "full dominion over all the ports,
rivers, creeks, and havens. and in as full and ample a
manner as they were before held by the Crown of England .
Commonwealth L
Charlestown, 18 Mass.
(1 Pick .) 180, 182
II

(1822) .

( 168) Boston Waterfront Dev .

378 Mass .
629, 633-34,
Commonwealth ~ Alger,

Corp.
~
Commonwealth,
393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
See also
61 Mass.
(7 Cush.) 53, 65-66

(1851) .

(169) Eoston Waterfront Dev.
Corp.
~
378 Mass .
6291 634, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979>'
( 170) .!lL-;
<t1e.
1981).

(171)

Opinion of the Justices,

Commonwealth,

437 A.2d 597,

605

See supra note 34.

(172) See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
(173) Colony Ordinance of 1641-47. ch.
LXIII. sec .
2,
Ancient Charters and Laws of the Colony and Province of
Massachusetts Bay 148 (1814 ed.) (cited in University of
Maine supra note 18, at 189) (hereinafter cited as Colony
Ordinance of 1641-47).
Section 3 of the ordinance provides:
It is declared, that in all creeks, coves
and other places about and upon salt water,
where the sea ebbs and flows, the p r-o p r i e t o r-.
or the land adJoining, shall have propriety to
the low water mark, where the sea doth not ebb
above a hundred rods, and not more wheresoever
it ebbs further :

Provided, that such proprieter
this liberty have power to stop or
pa ssage of boats or other vessels,
any sea, creeks or coves, to other
or lands.

shall not by
hinder the
in or through
men's houses
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~
~ also Boston Wate~f~ont Dev.
Corp.
~
Commonwealth, 378 Mass.
629, 635-36, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979);
Opinion of the -Ju s t t c e s , 437 A.2d 597,605 (Me.
1981>.

( 174) See Co 1 any Ord i nanc e of 1641-471

ch.

LXIII,

sees.

2-3.

supra note 1731 at
Section 2 provides:

Every inhabitant who is an householder
shall have free fishing and fowling in any
great ponds, bays, coves and riversl so far
as the sea ebbs and flows within the precincts
of the town, or the general court, have otherwise appropriated them:
P~ovided, that no town shall appropriate
to any particular person or persons, any
great pond, containing more than ten acres of
land. and that no man shall come upon another's
prop~iety without thei~ leave,
otherwise than
as hereafte~ expressed .

~
See also Opinion q£ the Justices. 365 Mass .
N. E. 2d 561, 566 (1974);
Commonwealth Y..:... Alger.
(7 Cush.) 53, 67-79 (1851>.

(175) Easton Waterfront Dev.
Corp.
~
378 Mass.
629, 637, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).

6811 313
61 Mass.

Commonwealth.

See Opinion of the Justices iR the Senate, 424
1092, 1099 (Mass.
1981>;
Commonwealth ~ Alger,
(7 Cush.) 53, 79 (1851).

(~76)

N . E . 2d

r1ass.

(177)

Opinion of the Justices

~

61

the Senate, 424 N.E. 2d
~
Alger, 61 Mass .

1092, 1099 (Mass.
1981);
Commonwealth
(7 Cush. ) 53, 74-75 <1851>.
(178) See Commonwealth
76-77 (1851).

~

Alger.

61 Mass .

(7 Cush. ) 53,

(179) ~ Although the Colonial Ordinance was enacted in
the Massachusetts Bay Colony, it was adopted by common law
throughout the rest oT the Province of Massachusetts.
~
at 76.

PAGE 78

(180) Boston Waterfront Dev .
Corp.
x;
378 Mass.
629, 640, 393 N .E.2d 356 (1979).

Commonwealth,

( 181> 1J!.:.-. at 637-38 (and statutes cited therein);
80, 82, 64 N. E.
688,
Bradfol'd ~ McQuesten. 18 Mass.
(1902) .

72

(182) See Commonwealth
{1851>.

~

Alger,

(18 :tlJ l.!L
(citing St.
1866,
(current version at Mass.
Ann.
(Michie/Law Co-op.
1975».

(185) St.
Laws ch.
91.

1859,
sec.

53,

(7 C u s h . )

61 Mass.

(183) Boston Waterfront Dev.
Corp .
~
378 Mass.
629,640,393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).

689

Commonwealth,

ch.

149,

sec.

Laws

ch .

91.

4,).
sec .

20

ch.
223 (current version at Mass .
2 (Michie/Law Co-op.
1975»,

Ann.

(la6) Commissioner ££ Public Works ~ Cities Servo
Oil
308 Mass.
349, 32 N . E . 2d 277, 281 (1941> (citing St.
1866. ch.
149, sec.
4) (current version at Mass.
Ann.

Co .•

Laws ch.

91,

sec .

( 187) Mass .
Co-op 1975).

Ann.

21

(Michie/Law Co-op.

Laws c h .

91,

sec.

(188) See ~, where all cases cited
deal with monetary compensation .
( 189) St.
Mass.
Ann.
1975) ) .

Supp .

21

1984» .

{Michie/Law.

in the annotation

149, sec.
5 (current version at
1866, ch .
91,
sec.
23 (Michie/Law.
Co-op.
Laws ch.

(190) Boston Waterfront Dev.
Corp.
~
Commonwealth.
378 Mass.
629.640,393 N.E .2d 356 (1979);
Commissioner of
Public Works ~ Cities Servo
Oil Co .• 308 Mass .
349, 32
N. E. 2d 277, 280 {1941> (both citing St.
1869, ch.
432,
sec.
1) (current version at Mass.
Ann.
Laws c h ,
91. sec.
15 (Michie/Law.
Co-op Supp .
1984) >.
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(191) St.
Mass .
Supp.

1869,

432, sec.
1 (current version at
sec.
15 (Mich ie/Law.
Co-op

c h.

91,

Ann.
Laws ch .
1984».

(192) Commissioner of Public Works ~ Cities Servo
Oil
Co., 308 Mass.
349, 32 N. E . 2d 277, 281 (1941) (citing St.
1874, c h .
284, sec.
1) (current version at Mass.
Ann.
Laws c n,
91. sec.
22 (Michie/Law.
Co-op .
Supp .
1984) .

(193) For the definition of one hundred rod lands.
supra text following note 34.

~

(194) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey, Esq.,
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
( J u n e 7, 1 984 ) .

(195) Boston Waterfront Dev.
Corp.
L
Commonwealth.
378 Mass.
629, 630, 637, 393 N. E. 2d 356 (1979) (citing St.
1832, ch.
102).

(196)

378 Mass.
therein).

Boston Waterfront Dev.
Corp.
L
629. 641. 393 N. E. 2d 356 (1979)

( 197) 378 Ma 5

5 .

629,

( 198)

!.L

at 646-49.

( 199)

!..!L....

at 649.

(200)

!.L

393 N. E. 2d 356

Commonweal th,
(and cases cited

(1979).

(201) Black's Law Dictionary 266 (5th ed.

1979) .

(202) Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,
1092, 1099 (J1ass.
1981) .

(203)

Accord

(204) !..!L....

~

at

at 1098,

1098.

1099.

424 N. E . 2d
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(205) See
(7 Cush . ) 53,

t~.

~

at 1099j
79 (18:51).

Commonwealth

~

Alger,

(206) See Answer ~ the Justices 1R the Senate,
E. 2d 170 01ass.
1980).

61 Mass.

415

(207) Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d
1092, 1098 (Mass.
1981) (citing S.
No.
1001).
See also
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1111
(Mass.
1981> (advi sory op ini on on similar b i 11, H.
No.
658) .
(208) Opinion Q£ the Justices
1092, 1098 (Mass.
1981).

~

the Senate,

424 N.E. 2d

(209) ~ at 1102.
Although the court believed that the
proposal directing how instruments were to b"e construed was
proper, it did not think it would release the Commonwealth's
interest in the submerged land involved in the Boston
Waterfront case.
l.fL.... at 1102.
In the court's opinion the
commonwealth's interest in the Boston Waterfront property
stemmed not by implication from legislation, but from the
legislature's failure to make a complete grant of the
commonwealth's and the public's interest in the land.
~
(210) See
dissenting) .

~

at 1110 (Liacos and Abrams,

JJ.,

(211) ~ at 1102-03.
The court concluded that the
vestigial interest of the commonwealth could be properly
el iminated.
~
at 1103.
(212) See

~

(213) See id.
dissenting) .

at 1103.
at 1110 (Liacos and Abrams,

JJ.,

(214) ~ at 1103-05.
The majority of the court
con c Lud edt his pro vis ion con s tit uti 0 n a 1.
l!L... a t 11 04. The
majority believed that a public trust interest of the ·t y p e
involved in the Boston Waterfront case could properly be
considered for release in the manner described in the bill .

.!JL...-
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(215)

~

at 1106-07.

(216) Act of Dec.
17, 1983, c h ,
589, with emergency
preamble, 1983 Mass.
Adv.
Legis.
Serv o
139 (Law.
Coop.
(relevant sections codified at Mass.
Ann.
Laws ch.
91,
sees.
1-24 (Michie/Law Coop.
Supp.
1984».

(217) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey, EsQ..,
note 194.
See Mass .
Ann.
Laws c h.
91, sec.
18
(Michie/Law.
Coop.
Supp .
1984).

supra

(218) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey,
note 194 .
See St.
1956, ch.
528.

supra

EsQ..,

(219) Mass.
Ann.
Laws ch.
91, sees.
1, 18
(Michie/Law.
Coop.
Supp.
1984).
The Department of
Environmental Quality, as well as the Department of
Environmental Management, are the successors of the Board of
Harbor Commissioners charged with protecting· the
commonwealth's tidelands.
See!..fL.... at sec.
1 (the end
result of St .
1919, c h ,
350, sec.
113, as amended by St.
1931, ch.
394, sec .
49, as amended by St.
1975, c h ,
706,
sees.
123, 312, as amended by St.
1983, c h ,
589, sec.

20) .

(220) Mass.
Ann.
1980) .
Coop.
Supp.

(221)

lfL....

(222)

1JL...

(223)

lfL....

(224)

l.!L..

at sec.

Laws ch.

91,

sec.

18 (M i chi e /Law.

1.

(225) 1JL... at sees.
14, 18.
These findings relate to
the development's contribution to the pUblic interest and
its compliance with other state programs.
1JL... at sec.
18.
(226)

l.Q.....

at sec.

14.
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(227) See supra notes 175-176,

196, and accompanying

te x t.
(228) See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text .
(229) See supra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
(230) .!lL...
(231) 1JL...
(232) See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
(233) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey.
note 194.

Esq.,

supra

(234) l.!:L....
(235) l.!:L....

See supra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.

(236) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey, "Es q . , supra
note 194.
For a discussion of these assessments, see supra
notes 185-188 and 192 and accompanying text, as well as the
statutes cited therein.
(237) University of Maine, supra note IB, at 306.
The
Massachusetts Legislature agreed to the separation on ~une
19, 1819, and the United State Congress voted to admit Maine
to the Union blJ an enactment dated March 3, 1820.
!.!L.... at
306 and nn .
3-4.
(citing Gen .
Laws of Mass .
1799-1822,
Acts and Laws, 1819, c h ,
36. ch.
162 and 3 U. S.
Stat.
544, en.
19 (1820».
(238) University of Maine.
(239) Barrows
(240) State

~

~

supra note 18,

McDermott,

Wilson,

73 Me.

42 Me.

2,

441,

at 187.
448 (1882).

26-27 (1856).
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(241) 'Ma r s h a l l Yo:( 1900) .
(242) State

ch.

~

Walker.

Wilson,

93 Me .

42 Me.

2,

532,

536.

45 A.

497

26-27 (1856)

(243) See Colon~ Ordinance of 1641-47.
LXIII. sec .
3.

supra note 173.

at

(244) See Me .
Rev.
Stat.
Ann .
tit .
12. sec.
559 (2)
(1 98 1 ) .
The r e "5 U b mer 9 e d 1 and" i s d e fin edt 0 inc 1 u d e
th e one hundred rod land s ,
.!JL...
(D)

(245) See supra notes 19-20 and

accompan~ing

text.

(246) See University of Maine. supra note 18. at 317.
This authorization would have to be given by the state
legislature or its delegate .
.!JL...
(247)

!J:L-

at 314.

(248) Opinion of the Justices,
1981 >.
(249) Whitmore

~

Brown.

437 A.2d 597.

102 Me .

47.

65 A.

598-99 (Me.

516,

520

C 1906).

(250) University of Maine, supra note 18, at 295.
A
fishing weir is a fixed structure constructed of posts
s u r r o u n d e d by brush or netting which is designed to catch
fish.
See Me .
Rev.
Stat.
Ann.
tit.
38, sec .
1021
( 1978).
(251 r Whitmore x., Brown, 102 Me.
47. 65 A.
516. 520
(1906) (citing Me.
Rev.
St.
ch.
4. sees.
96-99) ;
University of Maine, supra note 18. at 295 and n ,
249
(citing P.
L.
1876, ch .
78).
(current version at Me.
Rev.
Stat.
Ann .
tit .
38, sec .
1022 (1978) >.
See also
Blaney -c: Rittall. 312 A.2d 522. 528 (Me .
1973)
(252) !.!L-

PAGE 84

(253) WhitmorE' L
( 1906).

Brown,

102 Me.

65 A. 2d 516,

47,

520

(254) l.fL...(255) Morrison, SubmerQed Lands :
Public or Private
Ownership?, Com.
Fisheries News, Aug.
1983, at 30.

(256) See

infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.

(257) See

infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.

(258) Opinion Q£ the Justices,

437 A.2d 597,

599 (Me.

1981)

(259) Blaney y..:....

Rittall.

(260) ~ (citing Me.
4701 (repealed 1975) >.
(261)

Me.

Rev.

(262)

.!JL....

at sec.

471.

(263)

ld.

at sec.
453. s s c .

474.

Servo

ch.

Stat.

312 A.2d 522.

Rev.

Stat .

Ann.

ti t.

528 (Me.

Ann .

38,

ti t .

sec.

1973) .

12,

(1978).

472

as amended by 1983 Me.

Legis .

5.

(264) Opinion of the Justices,
1981 i .

437 A.2d 597,

599 (Me .

(265) .!JL....
(266)

lfL..)

(267) Me .

Morrison,

Rev.

Stat.

supra note 255,

Ann.

tit.

at 30.

12,

sec.

sec .

5013

( 1981 ) .

(268) "Submerged land" later was defined as "all land
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affected by the tides seaward of the natural low watermark
or 100 rods from the natural high watermark, whichever is
close to natural high watermark ." Me.
Rev .
Stat.
Ann.
tit'.
12, sec.
559 (2) <D) (1981>

(269) "Intertidal l an d " later was defined as "all land
affected by the tides below natural high watermark and
either 100 rods seaward therefrom or the natural low
watermark, whichever is closer to the natural high
watermark," .ilL. at sec.
559 (2) (13L that is, the tidal
flats.
See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
ti t.

(270) Me.
(1981)

Rev.

(271) l.f!..:597, 599 (Me.

See also Opinion of the Justices,
1981) .

Stat.

Ann.

12,

sec.

558

(2)

(A)

437 A.2d

(272) Me.
Rev.
Stat.
Ann.
tit.
12, Sec.
558 (2) (E)
(1981).
The fish landing and processing operations granted
no-cost easements could not occupy more than two thousand
square feet of state tidelands.
!Jt..... at sec. 558 (2) (B)
(3) .

(273) 1JL.... at sec.
558 (3).
Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 599 (Me.
note 255, at 30.

See also Opinion g£ the
1981 ) ;
M0 r r i son. 5 u D r a

(274) Me.
( 1981 ) .

tit.

Rev .

Stat.

Ann.

12,

sec.

559 (2)

fB)

(275) Compare Me.
Rev.
Stat.
Ann.
S-E!C.
559 (2) (a>
(1"981) with Colony Ordinance of 1641-47, supra note 173, at
c h.
LXIII, sec.
3.
For the statutory definition of
"intertidal land," see supra note 269.
(276) See Morrison,

(277)

supra

no~e

255,

at 30.

Ll!......

(278) See Me.
( 1981 ) .

Rev .

stat :

Ann.

ti t.

12,

sec.

559
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(279) !.fL.-

(Me.

at sec .

559 (3) .

(280) Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597,
1981>'
See Me.
Rev.
Stat .
Ann.
tit.

559 (7)

605 and n.4
12, sec.

( ·1981> .

(281) Opinion of the Justices,
1981) .
(282) Me.
( 1981 ) .

Rev.

Stat.

Ann .

437 A.2d 597,

ti t .

12,

sec.

606 (Me.

559 (1)

(283) .i!L....
(284) See Opinion of the Justices> 437 A.2d 597 (Me.
1981).
The Maine court relied heavily upon the advisory
opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
concerning a similar bill, ~ at 607-611. which is
discused supra notes 207-215 and accompanying text.

(Me.

(285) Opinion of the Justices,
1981>.
(286) ~

at 608.

(287) .i!L....

at 607 .

(288) l.f!.:.-

(289)

l.!L...

(290) 1l!..:.-

at 607-08.

(291)

at 608.

l..!L.-

(292) l.fL(293)

l!L..

437 A.2d 597,

607,

609
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at 608-09 .

(294)

~

(295)

Morrison,

supra note 25:5,

at 30 .

(296) Me.
Rev.
Stat.
Ann.
tit.
12, sec.
See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text .

559

(1981) .

(297) Me .
Rev.
Stat. ·An n .
tit.
12, sec.
558 (1981> .
See supra notes 2'71-74 and accompanying text.
Amendments to
the permitting statute for wharves and weirs, which were
passed in 1975, specifically provided that any license for
such a structure "does not confer any right, title or
interest in submerged or intertidal lands owned by the
State." P.
L.
1975, th.
287, sec.
2 (codified at Me.
Rev.
Stat.
Ann.
tit .
38. sec.
1022 (1978>'
(298) See Me.
( 1978).

Stat.

Rev.

(299) See Morrison,

Ann .

ti t.

supra note 255,

12,

sec .

558

at 30.

(300) .!.fL-.

It is possible that Me.
Rev.
Stat .
Ann .
tit.
sec .
558 (1981) will be interpreted as a repeal of the
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47, and a reassertion of the
state's interest in tidal flats not yet appropriated by
riparian owners.
If so, shorefront landowners will no
longer be able to obtain title to the adJacent tidal flats
by filling these lands.
(301)

12,

(302)

See

Morrison,

supra note 255,

(303) See supra notes

(~04)

See

at 30.

170-74 and accompanying tex t.

supra notes 179 and 239 and accompanying text.

(305) See supra notes 39-44 and

accompan~ing

(306) See supra note 169 and accompanying

te xt.

tex t .
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(307) See supra notes 170-73 and 239-40 and accompanying
tex t.
(308) See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
(309) See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
(310) See supra notes 174,
accompanying text.

177 and 240-41 and

(311) See supra notes 175-76 and 242 and accompanying
tex t.
(312) See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
(313) See supra tex·t following notes 230 and 300 .
(314) See supra Commonwealth
7)

53,

72

~

Alger.

61 Mass.

(Cush .

(1851.>'

(315) See supra note 49 and accompanying tex t.
(316) See supra note 184 and accompanying tex t .
(317) See supra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
(318) See supra note 50 and accompanying text .

(319) See supra notes 186-88 and 192 and accompanying
te x t.
(320) See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying tex t.

(321) See supra notes 45-46 and 49 and

acco~panying

(322) See supra note 184 and accompanying tex t .

tex t .
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(323) See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text .
(324) See supra notes 186-B8 and accompanying text.
(325) See supra note

19~

and accompanying text.

(326) See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
(327) See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text .
(328) See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
(329) See supra notes 49, 184,
259-63 and accompanying text.

(330) See supra notes
and accompanying text.

163~65,

189,

229,

217-26,

231-32,

251-54 and

297 and 301

(331) See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
(332) See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
(333) See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
(334) See supra notes 103-07 and 117 and accompanying
text.
(335) See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
(336) See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
(337) See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
(338) See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
(339) See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text .

r
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(340) See

5up~a

note 236 and accompanying text.

(341) See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
(342) See sup~a notes 66-67,
and accompanying text.

tell

(343) See supra notes 134,
t.

99-101,

205-07 and 279-83

147 and 283 and accompanying

(344) See sup~a notes 67-79, 117-18,
and 278-80 and accompanying text.

206-07,

216,

267-70

(345) See supra notes 99-100 and 293 and accompanying
te x t.

(346) See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text .
(347)

See The Water's Edge,

sup~a

note I.

at 6-16.

'( 3 4 8 ) See generally R.
Powell and P.
Rohan,
Real Property sees.
1012-1026 (abr.
1968).
(349) See, e. g. ,
Owner's Dilemma, pt.
(350) See,

~.

Powell

Q.!l

at sec.
1020;
Porro, Meadowlands
1 supra note 66. at 15-16.

~

Sax,

supra note 76 at 478-89 .

(351) See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text .
(352) See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
(353) See supra notes 79-83,

93 and 120-23 and

accompanying text .

(354) See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
(355) See supra note 146 and accompanying text .
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(356) See supra note 234 and accompanying text.

(357) See supra note 235 and accompanying text.

(358) Opinion of the Justices,
1981) .
(359)

~

437 A.2d 597,

608 (Me.

at 607.

(360) See supra notes 113 and 295 and accompanying text .
(361) See supra notes 163-65,
and accompanying text .

229,

231-32,

297 and 301

(362) See supra notes 147-54 and 161-62 and accompanying
te x t.
(363) See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
(364) In contrast, New Jersey's compensation rate
apparently has been administratively set.
See supra notes
150-54 and accompanying text.
(365) In New Jersey, it is surprising that there are 50
few challenges to state tidelands claims, considering the
probabilit~ of success in such a proceeding.
See supra
notes 148-49 and accompanying text.
The only apparent
explanation ror the lack of claims contests is the
burdensome nature of the appeal, since no appeals process is
provided other than the standard ~uiet title suit.
See ~
(366) See supra text accompanying notes
(367) See, e. g.,
accompanying text.

334~41.

supra notes 99-100 and 293 and

(368) See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424
N. E. 2d 1092, 1096, 1109 app. A (Mass.
1981)J
Opinion Qf. the
Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 599 (Me.
1981 >.
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(369) See supra notes 285-94 and accompanying text.
(370) See supra notes 147-54 and 161-62 and accompanying

te xt.
(371) See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
(372) If the landholder filled the tidelands himself, in
violation of the statute, he obviously is not a "good faith"
property holder .
Similarly, since public awareness of the
issue of illegally filled tidelands has been high during the

past decade or more, any potential purchaser of recently
filled tidelands should have been on notice to investigate
the land's true status.
(373) See supra note 365.

